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ABSTRACT 
The 21st century features disaggregated supply chains that can reduce costs but also limit firms’ 
ability to monitor and control critical processes, including labor practices and the sourcing of 
supplies. My dissertation examines issues of sustainability, accountability, and organizational 
structure in today’s world of globally dispersed supply chains. In particular, I empirically 
examine the evolution of buyer-supplier relationships in the mobile phone industry.  
The first empirical essay concerns how labor issues affect buyer−supplier relationships at 
the dyadic level. I examine the manner and mechanisms by which mobile phone companies 
respond to labor protests targeting their suppliers. I find that user-generated social media content 
can help make buyer-supplier relationship more visible to the public, pushing firms to disengage 
from protested suppliers. I also compare the consequences of labor protests, for which suppliers are 
partially responsible, to natural disasters, for which suppliers are not responsible. Furthermore, I 
conduct an exhaustive search of press releases and newspaper articles, and find that firms rarely 
acknowledge supply chain labor issues. This essay suggests that increasing the visibility of 
buyer−supplier links through user-generated social media can make firms more accountable for 
supply chain labor issues. 
 The second empirical essay investigates how an industry-wide, sudden increase in the 
visibility of supply chains influences network mechanisms driving supply chain network 
evolution. I utilize stochastic actor-oriented models, specifying several events that occurred in 
2010 as an environmental jolt. The findings indicate that the supply chain network became 
denser after the jolt, resulting in more opportunities for suppliers to attract new relationships. 
However, the level of network inequality also increased—previously popular suppliers captured 
most of the new opportunities. Thus, a previously dispersed and modularized network became 
more centralized, featuring a strong core-periphery structure. Firms’ endeavors to achieve supply 
chain sustainability in the aftermath of environmental jolts may allow established suppliers to 
remain entrenched as central players in the network.  
Overall, my dissertation underlines the importance of studying global supply chains to 
better understand industry evolution and corporate strategy in the 21st century. This work seeks 








Introduction: Dissertation Overview 
 
Nowadays, firms rarely operate as Ford Motor Company did in the 1930s. They do not make 
every part on-site. Neither do they own mines and plantations overseas. Instead, they rely on a 
network of suppliers. The 20th century’s vertically integrated corporation has been supplanted by 
disaggregated global supply chains across many industries. “Nikefication” can be observed in 
close to all industries, from electronics to garments, and even pet food (Davis, 2013). Apple 
iPhones, Gap clothing and Nestlé Purina cat food are all manufactured by distant, unknown 
contractors, not by the brand name company that most consumers can easily recognize. Although 
dispersed supply chains can significantly reduce firms’ cost structures, they also limit their 
ability to monitor and control critical processes, including labor practices and the sourcing of 
materials. This presents many challenges around effectively pursuing sustainability and social 
responsibility objectives beyond a focal firm’s legal and physical boundary. 
One major issue with globally dispersed supply chains is that it makes detecting the 
identity of suppliers extremely difficult (Kim & Davis, 2016). For example, in 2013 
Bangladesh’s Rana Plaza collapsed, killing over 1,100 garment workers. In the aftermath of the 
Rana Plaza disaster, authorities in Dhaka could not even determine the number of factories that 
fell under their jurisdiction, and some global brands reported that their products were being 
produced by unauthorized subcontractors. Companies like Apple and Hewlett-Packard have had 
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to spend extra efforts to vet their supply chains and clean their products from the use of conflict 
materials. While there is some evidence that working conditions at first-tier suppliers are getting 
better, even car manufacturers, which rely heavily on their supply chains, have difficulty 
identifying their fourth- or fifth-tier suppliers.  
Another major issue with globally dispersed supply chains is that they make it 
challenging for firms to implement sustainability policies. One study found that in 2009, only six 
firms out of the Fortune 500 were able to disclose full information on greenhouse gas emissions 
across their entire value chain (Jackson, 2011). Indeed, more than half of a typical corporation’s 
carbon emissions come from its supply chain rather than within its own boundaries (AT Kearney, 
2011). Assessing overall environmental or social risks requires engagement with suppliers 
several steps back, which are often invisible to firms. 
Finally, as supply chains are increasingly becoming longer, more dispersed, and more 
complex. Companies are also increasingly exposed to high impact low probability discrete 
events along their supply chains (Kleindorfer & Saad, 2005). From the buying company’s 
perspective, these events can lead to a failure in cost reduction, in quality and in volume. Such 
supply chain disruptions may not only impair the production process, but may also tarnish 
stakeholders’ perceptions of the focal company (Hoejmose, Roehrich, & Grosvold, 2014). As a 
result, both financial performance and reputation can be affected by how a firm manages 
disruptions occurring outside its direct control. 
My dissertation explores the interplay between social supply chain sustainability and 
supply chains dynamics. Specifically, my two research questions are as follows: (1) what are the 
manners and mechanisms by which companies respond to social movements targeting their 
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suppliers?; (2) what network mechanisms drive network evolution following a shift in field-level 
attention and visibility that pertains to labor issues in supply chains? 
Theoretically, my dissertation is motivated from three interrelated literatures in 
organizational research. First, research on covert and corrupt networks suggests that the networks 
consisting of actors who have unethical or secretive objectives typically feature a distinct 
network structure with distinct properties (e.g., Aven, 2015; Baker & Faulkner, 1993; Erickson, 
1981; Krebs, 2002). Staying invisible and achieving the necessary coordination between its 
members are often incompatible goals that force a trade-off. Insights from this line of research 
can be drawn to identify network structures that are likely to be associated with secretive, 
unethical behaviors (Lauchs, Keast, & Yousefpour, 2011), or to design network structures that 
optimize communication among network members while minimizing the probability of being 
exposed (Lindelauf, Borm, & Hamers, 2009). Given the dispersed, opaque nature of global 
supply chains, I am interested in understanding the impact of supply chain visibility, which can 
be defined as “the identity, location and status of entities transiting the supply chain, captured in 
timely messages about events” (Francis, 2008: 182). I investigate how a sudden increase in the 
network visibility changes firm behavior and subsequent network structures. I also differentiate 
between different types of networks which correspond to different breadths of exposure (or 
visibility): When a certain node or dyad has been exposed (or becomes visible) due to a negative 
event, will firms sever that relationship? If the entire industry faces such an increase in exposure, 
how will firms’ networking patterns change? Given the recursive nature of social actions and 
social structures (Giddens, 1984), I explore how social structures constrain actors’ underlying 
networking patterns, and how actors modify social structures by changing their previous 
networking patterns. 
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Second, research on visibility teaches us that firms that receive high levels of public 
attention are subject to greater levels of external pressures and demands (Salancik, 1979). Visible 
firms receive more media attention, making them more vulnerable to shareholder activism and 
protests (King & McDonnell, 2015; Rehbein, Waddock, & Graves, 2004). Visible firms also 
receive more diverse and intense stakeholder demands, and they seek to accommodate diverging 
interests from stakeholders (Brammer & Millington, 2006; Fiss & Zajac, 2006). This line of 
research suggests that visibility, either at the node, dyad, or field level, may push firms to be 
more highly sensitive to social and political stakeholders. I link these arguments with the 
attention-based view of the firm (Ocasio, 1997), which argues that firm behavior is the result of 
how an organization channels and distributes the attention of its decision-makers. I propose a 
model in which external stakeholders (e.g., social media users, journalists) increase the visibility 
of select parts of supply chain networks, which influences firm decision-makers’ assessment of 
how much attention they should focus on particular issues and answers. Throughout my 
dissertation, I argue that firms’ decision-making is partially determined by outsiders’ or public 
attention which shapes the particular situation in which the firm finds itself; and the efforts 
intended to raise outsiders’ or public attention can be an effective social movement strategy 
targeting firms (e.g., Luo, Zhang, & Marquis, 2016). 
Finally, my dissertation draws heavily from research on network dynamics and field 
evolution (Ahuja, Soda, & Zaheer, 2012; Fligstein & McAdam, 2011, 2012; Powell, White, 
Koput, & Owen-Smith, 2005). Firms as collective actors are made up of an organizational field, 
and interorganizational networks facilitate or constrain economic action among members. While 
usually these fields (or networks as a whole) reproduce themselves (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 
1992), the dominant logics that make these fields persistent and sticky can be challenged. Extant 
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literature suggests the source of such challenges can be both local (i.e., affects a part of the field) 
and global (i.e., affects the entire field). Within a field, there are challengers who occupy less 
powerful positions within the field and normally have little influence over the constitution of the 
dominant logic. However, at times the challengers can mobilize and create contentious episodes 
(Gamson, [1975]1990). Such episodes of contention, in turn, can change the interaction pattern 
between the dominant incumbent and the challengers (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012). At the same 
time, destabilizing shocks or jolts occasionally occur and they perturb the stability of the logic 
constituting the social structure.  Such “shocks” to a system “…can destabilize it and result in a 
tip in the rules of affiliation and the resulting combinatorial possibilities” (Powell et al., 
2005:1190). Therefore, the occurrence of an environmental jolt, i.e., a low probability discrete 
event impacting all market participants, provides an opportunity to investigate the process by 
which an organizational field transforms. My focus on supplier labor protests directly draws 
from this argument, investigating how such events change network dynamics both at the dyadic 
level and the global network level. 
 Data availability has been one of the biggest challenges of empirically studying supply 
chain relationships. Organizational scholarship on supply chain relationships has typically relied 
on survey methods (with Uzzi, 1997, being a notable exception), asking company managers to 
recall a list of their suppliers. Sometimes researchers work with a single target company, which 
gives them detailed insider information on the company’s suppliers. However, given the 
increasing complexity of supply-chain networks, which often incorporate multiple tiers of 
suppliers (i.e., second, third, and above), many manufacturers may have limited insight into the 
functioning of the overall supply-chain network. 
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Brammer and his colleagues’ (2011) review on the sustainable global supply chains 
literature best describes the state of the research. The literature is presently dominated by case-
based and anecdotal analyses that highlight the problems and issues faced when managing global 
supply chains. The most popular research method is face-to-face interviews (emphasis on 
qualitative approaches), followed by postal surveys. The rigor of research is often questioned, 
showing relative lack of theoretical contributions. Another problem is the selection issue in terms 
of the industries researchers are choosing to study. About half of all studies focus on the 
textiles/apparel industry, which can be described as a labor-intensive, non-high-tech field with a 
sufficient number of replaceable suppliers along the supply chain.  
 Therefore, in this my dissertation I chose to study the supply chain network in the mobile 
handset industry.  This industry is highly competitive, making it very difficult for a company to 
maintain competitive advantage for a prolonged period (e.g., Motorola, Nokia).  Most users 
abandon their cellphones in 20 months.  Production usually spans multiple countries, and to 
make mobile handsets, one needs both state-of-the-art chipsets as well as sweatshops for 
assembly.  The complex nature of the industry also invites a long list of technology-related 
problems (e.g., patent war between Apple and Samsung) as well as labor-rights-related problems 
(e.g., Flextronics’s indentured servitude).  
Overall, this dissertation has three goals. First, I aim to underline the importance of 
understanding global supply chains in order to better understand industry evolution and corporate 
strategy in the 21st century. Given today’s organizations’ heavy reliance on global supply chains, 
the small number of organizational theories and methodologies addressing global supply chain 
dynamics is surprising.  Second, I seek to contribute to the research on supplier selection by 
introducing how the concern for social sustainability can shape supplier (partner) choice. This 
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complements existing research, which focuses on the cost minimization and risk management 
objectives of suppliers. Finally, I seek to provide new data sources (e.g., teardown reports of a 
product, social media posts) and methods (e.g., topic modeling, simulation) to improve research 
on organizational accountability. As much as a significant portion of sustainability-related issues 
stem from the dispersed and opaque nature of the production process, researchers also need to 
equip themselves with innovative way of capturing the problem. In this regard, I hope to show 
how new “big data” research can help address perennial organizational questions. 
The remainder of this dissertation consists of four chapters. In the following chapter, I 
provide an overview of supply chain networks in the mobile handset industry (Chapter Two). In 
Chapter Three, I investigate the manner and mechanisms by which social movements (e.g., labor 
protests and strikes) influence buyer-supplier relationships, using a sample of mobile handset 
manufacturers and their first-tier suppliers from 2002 to 2014. In Chapter Four, I study how an 
industry-wide, sudden increase in the visibility of the supply chains influences the evolution of 
organizational fields, using the events that occurred in 2010 as an environmental jolt in a 
simulation study. Finally, in Chapter Five, I summarize the key findings and provide 










Context: Global Supply Chain Networks in the Mobile Handset Industry, 2002-2014 
 
The purpose of this chapter to give an overview of the empirical context of my dissertation: 
supply chain networks in the mobile handset industry from 2002 to 2014. Mobile handsets have 
become very pervasive in people’s everyday lives. According to a Pew Research survey (2017), 
in the United States about 62% of adults owned a cellphone in 2002, the beginning of my 
observation period. This number increased to 90% in 2014, which is the end of my observation 
period. The percentage of U.S. adults owning a smartphone skyrocketed from 35% in 2011 to 77% 
in 2016. As of October 2014, there are more active mobile devices (including tablets and feature 
phones) in the world than there are people, according to GSMA’s real-time tracker 
(https://www.gsmaintelligence.com/).  
Another reason why I focus on this industry is because it represents the dominant features 
of the current economy. One of Peter Evans’s (1995) insights was that a nation state’s political-
economic structure and strategy can be best understood by vetting a representative product or 
industry, and that examining how such representative products are made or how such industries 
grow contributes to understanding the economic, social, and technological characteristics of a 
nation state. Arguably, the automotive industry was the quintessential industry of the 60s and 70s, 
followed by the computer and semiconductor industries in the 80s and 90s. In the 21st century, 
the mobile handset industry is the archetypal industry that embodies the characteristics of late 
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capitalism: high level of competition, technology-intensiveness, and heavy reliance on global 
supply chains.  As shown in Figure 1, this industry is highly competitive, making it very difficult 
for a company to maintain competitive advantage for a prolonged period (e.g., the demise of 
Motorola and Nokia). Industry analysts estimate that most phones have a market life cycle of 9 
to 12 months; most users change their cellphones in 24 months (Entner, 2011).  
 
Figure 1. Market Share of Worldwide Mobile Phone Unit Sales, 2002-2014 
 
Notes: 
“Others” include mobile phone brands that had market share figures that were smaller than 5% throughout the entire 
observations period. Examples include Research In Motion (BlackBerry), Xiaomi, and Lenovo.  
Source: Gartner 
 
Like most companies in the electronics sector that aim to outsource more than 70 percent of their 
manufacturing (Doig, Ritter, Speckhals, & Woolson, 2001), most mobile phone brands outsource 
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Cupertino, Calif., makes an iPhone for $179, $114 of the $179 goes to Japanese, German, and 
South Korean suppliers, while only about $11 goes to American workers (Rassweiler, 2009).  
Production of mobile handsets usually spans multiple countries, and to make mobile handsets, 
one needs both state-of-the-art chipsets as well as sweatshops for assembly. As a result, buyer-
supplier relationships tend to endure in this industry. Indeed, a longitudinal analysis on supplier 
selection in this industry documents that there are high perceived switching costs and strong 
inertia in customer–supplier matches (Alcacer & Oxley, 2014). 
At the same time, the mobile handset industry is no stranger to labor rights violations. For 
instance, the series of tragic suicides in Shenzhen-based Foxconn, one of Apple’s major 
suppliers, forced Apple to request a third-party investigation (Josephs, 2013). It took nearly eight 
years for Samsung, another major manufacturer, to acknowledge the association between the 
unsafe work environment in its own and subsidiaries’ factories, and the unending chain of 
workers who died from leukemia (Robbins, 2015). 
DATA 
The population of my study consists of all mobile handset manufacturers around the world, as 
well as their suppliers, for mobile handsets that were released from 2002 to 2014. This period 
covers both the era of feature phones and the era of smart phones. 2007, the year in which the 
original iPhone was introduced, sits in the middle of the observation period. Since companies 
consider the identity of their suppliers to be proprietary information, collecting supply chain 
information across multiple companies introduces a significant barrier for researchers. For 
example, the High Performance Manufacturing (HPM) project is an ongoing global research 
network to collect detailed plant-level information in the automobile, machinery, and electronic 
industries (Schroeder & Flynn, 2001). However, linking individual participants’ survey 
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responses with other databases is effectively impossible. Another commonly-used source of 
buyer-supplier relationship data is the Compustat Segment file (e.g., Cohen & Frazzini, 2008). 
Regulation SFAS No. 131 requires suppliers to disclose any major customer that represents more 
than 10% of its total reported sales. The Compustat segment data capture this information, but 
entail two noticeable limitations. First is the sampling bias; since only major customers 
contributing more than 10% of sales are reported, data are missing for small customers, thus 
making it difficult to comprehensively capture buyer-supplier relationships. Second is the 
omission of major international (non-US based) suppliers despite the fact that firms have 
increasingly relied on global suppliers over the past decade (Wang, Li, & Anupindi, 2015). 
As an alternative, to capture fine-grained supplier-manufacturer relationships in the 
global mobile handset industry, I extracted each component’s maker (suppliers) information 
from individual models’ bill-of-materials compiled by Information Handling Services (IHS). 
This company buys electronic products and breaks them down to trace their component suppliers. 
Each phone contains hundreds of components. Once the IHS technicians decompose a phone into 
its components, they extract the lot number assigned to each component and verify the 
component’s supplier name, function, cost, and specification. I obtained all mobile handset 
teardown reports published by IHS until 2014, which yielded 399 models. On average, a mobile 
phone in my sample consists of 290 components, with a standard deviation of 130. 
Figure 2 shows a snapshot of a bill-of-materials report analyzing Apple iPhone 4. 
Throughout my dissertation, I call the companies appearing in the second column (e.g., Samsung, 
Toshiba, Cirrus Logic) the buyer’s (Apple in this example) component suppliers. When a buyer’s 
name (mobile phone brand name) is identical to a component suppliers’ name, I assume that 
component was made in-house as opposed to being outsourced. The identity of assemblers such 
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as Foxconn is unverifiable for each mobile handset as companies only have to disclose the 
assembler’s location at the country level (e.g., “Made in China”). Accordingly, all suppliers 
shown in my dissertation are component manufacturers. 




This is a summarized (e.g., aggregates costs at the component group level, only shows a partial list of suppliers), 
preliminary version of a bill-of-materials report IHS made public for free. The actual, detailed reports I used in my 
dissertation are proprietary and cannot be reproduced or published in any form without prior written consent with 




One caveat of IHS’s proprietary data collection approach is that they do not have access to the 
original equipment manufacturers’ approved vendor lists (AVLs). Teardowns are essentially an 
autopsy report for a single device, even though some components of that model may have two or 
more supplier options. To mitigate this measurement error, I cross-referenced the IHS data with a 
newly available data source, the Bloomberg Supply Chain Function. Bloomberg maps out about 
35,000 companies in terms of their suppliers and buyers by showing the most recent snapshot of 
money flows between companies on both a buyer (revenue) and supplier (cost) basis. Bloomberg 
collects supply chain information from various sources including public filings (which makes the 
Compustat segment data a subset of the Bloomberg data), announcements from manufacturers 
and their suppliers, and other propriety data Bloomberg purchases (Steven, Dong, & Corsi, 2014). 
Deriving information from a variety of data sources allows Bloomberg to capture more 
comprehensive supply chain data. For S&P 500 high-tech firms, for example, the total number of 
suppliers identified by Bloomberg was on average seven times larger than that identified by 
Compustat (Wang et al., 2015). Currently, Bloomberg only provides a cross-sectional data set 
with the latest annual relationships. I used the Bloomberg supply chain data as of December 31, 
2015.  
Altogether, my final sample consists of 46 mobile handset manufacturers and 558 first-
tier suppliers that directly sold their components to at least one of those manufacturers. Although 
my data are not exhaustive and may not capture every significant handset supply contract, 
industry experts who I spoke to verified that the mobile handsets present in my data account for 
over 90% of the phones sold in the world. I checked the validity of my data through comparing 
the list of component suppliers shown in various electronic product review and comparison 
websites where the specifications of some mobile handsets are publicly shared. I also collected 
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information on headquarter and factory locations of buyers and suppliers from Compustat, Orbis, 
Bloomberg, and extensive internet search (e.g., online job advertisements recruiting temporary 
factory workers). 
DESCRIPTIVES 
Geographic Distribution of the Production Process 
Figures 3-5 show the geographic distribution of mobile phone brands’ (buyers) headquarters, 
their component suppliers’ headquarters, and their suppliers’ factories, retrospectively. Unlike 
assemblers that are geographically focused in East Asia (e.g., China and South Korea), the 
component suppliers are located across the whole of North America, Europe, and Asia. This 
spatial distribution of suppliers depicts the globally dispersed supply chains in the mobile 
handset industry, and also serves as a source of variation (e.g., different levels of workers’ rights 




Figure 3. Geographic Distribution of Buyers’ Headquarters 
 
Sources: IHS, Bloomberg, Compustat, and firm websites 
 
Figure 4. Geographic Distribution of Suppliers’ Headquarters 
 
Sources: IHS, Bloomberg, Compustat, and firm websites 
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Figure 5. Geographic Distribution of Suppliers’ Factories 
 
Source: IHS, Bloomberg, Compustat, and firm websites 
 
 
Once a component manufacturer makes a component, it is sent to an assembly facility where 
workers engage in assembly and packaging. These tasks require a relatively low skill level, and 
thus the majority of assembly facilities are located in countries where labor is cheap and 
abundant. While firms do not provide the identity of their assemblers, each module (e.g., main 
chipset, camera, etc.) will have the name of the country in which a given module was assembled. 
Figure 6 shows the location of the assembly locations. Half of the phones were assembled in 




Figure 6. Distribution of Assembly Locations a 
 
Notes: 
a 5.36% of the phones in my sample were assembled in two or more countries. 
* IHS data had a separate category named “East Europe” as one of assembly locations. Among 10.73% of phones 
assigned to the “Hungary & Eastern Europe” category, 5.63% were labeled East Europe, 4.83% were labeled 
Hungary, and 0.27% were labeled Czech Republic. 
** Includes the following countries: Malaysia (1.88%), Japan (1.61%), Finland (1.34%), India, Brazil, Germany, 




In Figure 7, I present the global structure of the supply chain network, aggregated over all 
phones released from 2002 to 2014. Nodes with a label represent buyers, and nodes without a 
label are component suppliers. Node sizes are proportional to node degree, edges are unweighted, 
and loops (i.e., a component was in-sourced) are removed from the graph. One distinctive 
characteristic of this network is a clear network community structure. Network communities are 







China South Korea Hungary & Eastern Europe* Taiwan Others** Mexico
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2003b; Newman, 2004). I used a network community detection algorithm proposed by Clauset, 
Newman, and Moore (2004). This approach focuses on a measure called modularity, a quality 
function that captures how well a given partition of a network compartmentalizes its 
communities (i.e. how much a network can be ‘modularized’).  A network’s modularity is, up to 
a multiplicative constant, the number of edges falling within groups minus the expected number 
in an equivalent network with edges placed at random. Node colors represent community 
membership, wherein nodes of a same color fall under the same network community. While 
there are a significant amount of ties across network communities, this figure shows that some 
pairs of buyers (e.g., Samsung and LG) are more likely to have a common set of suppliers 
compared to other pairs of buyers (e.g., Samsung and Apple). 
 





Technological Change, Insourcing vs. Outsourcing, and Automation 
During my observation period (2002-2014), the mobile handset industry witnessed the rise and 
dominance of smartphones over feature phones. Smartphones are loosely defined as a mobile 
personal computer that can be used for handheld use. Some common features of smartphones 
include a touch screen interface, a mobile operating system, and internet access. Arguably the 
first smartphone to be made and marketed was BellSouth’s Simon Personal Communicator 
which was released in 1994. However, it was the original iPhone, released in 2007, which 
spearheaded the dominance of smartphones in the mobile handset industry.  
 Figure 8 shows the growing proportion of smartphones among the mobile handsets in my 
sample. I used the three aforementioned criteria (i.e., touch screen interface, a mobile operating 
system, and internet access) to measure if a phone was a smartphone or a feature phone. While 
my data do not track the population of mobile phones, the trend itself is undeniable. In 2007 and 
2008, less than a quarter of released phones were considered smartphones. Three out of four 




Figure 8. The Rise of Smartphones After 2007 
 
Notes: 
The red line denotes the median-spline plot. 
The proportion of smartphones is measured as the number of sampled smartphones divided by the total number of 
sampled phones released in a given year. 
Source: IHS 
 
Like most companies in the electronics sector, mobile phone brands typically outsource a lion’s 
share of their production process. For each phone in my sample, I calculated the proportion of 
components that were insourced, i.e., the component manufacturer name is identical to the 
buyer’s name among all components of which manufacturers were identifiable. As shown in 
Figure 9, the share of insourced components was already quite low at the beginning of my 
observation period. On average, only about 3% of components are made by the company named 
on the final product label. Mobile phone brands are also insourcing fewer components over time, 
and the correlation between the proportion of insourced components and model release year is 
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production serves as an exemplary case for so-called “Nikefication,” whereby mobile phone 
brands (i.e., buyers) tend to concentrate on the design and marketing of their products while 
contracting out production to vendors in Asia and elsewhere (Davis, 2011).  
 
Figure 9. Proportion of In-sourced Components, 2002-2014 
 
Notes: 
The red line denotes the median-spline plot. 
The proportion of in-sourced components is measured as the number of components of which component 
manufacturer names are identical to the brands’ (i.e., buyers’) name divided by the number of total components of 




Mobile handset production requires both state-of-the-art chipsets as well as cheap labor for 
assembly. The production of certain parts can be easily standardized, relying on automation and 
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difficult and/or costly to automate. For each component inserted in a mobile handset, IHS 
determines its insert method, namely by hand or by machine. Using this information, for each 
phone I calculated the proportion of components that were manually inserted as opposed to 
inserted by machine. As shown in Figure 10, nine out of ten components are inserted by machine, 
and this trend is rather stable even after the rise of smartphones.  
 
Figure 10. Proportion of Manually Inserted Components, 2002-2014 
 
Notes: 
The red line denotes the median-spline plot. 
The proportion of manually inserted components is measured as the number of components that were inserted 
manually (i.e., not via a machine) divided by the number of total components of which manufacturers are 
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Similarly, weighting each component by its cost to account for each component’s relative 
importance does not drastically alter this trend. In Figure 11, I calculated the proportion of 
production cost incurred by in-sourcing out of a product’s total production cost. Although there 
are more outliers in which in-sourcing accounts for more than half of a model’s production cost, 
there is no statistically significant correlation between the release year and the proportion of in-
sourced components’ cost (p>0.1). On average, in-sourcing only accounted for 6% of a model’s 
total production cost throughout the observation period. 
 




The red line denotes the median-spline plot. 
The proportion of manually inserted components’ cost is measured as the sum of manufacturing cost of all 

























































Finally, another important feature that pertains to the mobile handset industry is the rise of labor 
protests. Because of the need for cheap labor for assembly, a significant portion of workers face 
potentially unsafe working conditions and low wage, which can lead to labor protests. However, 
the number of reported labor protests is surprisingly low and remained relatively stable until 
2010. Figure 12 (in solid line) shows the number of unique labor protests targeting sampled firms, 
including buyers (e.g., Samsung and LG). I collected labor protests data from a variety sources, 
including all publications indexed by Factiva, two crowd-mapped data sets on labor strikes in 
China (China Labour Bulletin; China Strike), and MediaGaon (a media portal that archives over 
50 Korean news outlets). In addition, two Chinese-speaking research assistants searched the 
occurrence of protest events for China- and Taiwan-based suppliers through internet search. As a 
point of comparison, I also show (in dash) the number of all labor protests shown in the GDELT 
(Global Database of Events, Language, and Tone; http://gdeltproject.org/) database (Leetaru & 
Schrodt, 2013). GDELT does not name the source and target of a protest, but instead codes them 
by the type of actors such as government, business, labor, etc. I included all protests events 
initiated by the labor and targeting businesses. Labor protests from all countries and all industries 
were included. Again, the number of labor protests reported in the press is surprisingly low, but 
also reflects how central and representative the mobile handset industry is when it comes to 
reported labor protests. On average, the mobile handset industry experienced 8 labor protests per 




Figure 12. Number of Labor Protests, 2002-2014 
 
Source: Factiva, China Labour Bulletin, China Strike, MediaGaon, and GDELT 
 
SUMMARY 
In summary, a descriptive analysis of the history of the mobile handset industry reveals four 
things. First, the production network is globally dispersed, spanning both developed and 
developing economies. However, the majority of assembly work is occurring in Asia. Second, 
the global supply chain network features a strong network community structure whereby some 
pairs of buyers are more likely to have a common set of suppliers compared to other pairs of 
buyers. Third, the mobile handset industry experienced a massive technological shift from 
feature phones to smartphones. However, the level of reliance on suppliers as well as the level of 











2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Sample GDELT
 26 
Finally, while the overall frequency is low, the industry has often been a target of labor protests, 





When Do Mobile Phone Brands Disengage from Protested Suppliers? 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Products are now routinely produced and sold having never been touched by employees of the 
company named on the label, and firms increasingly outsource their manufacturing to an 
expansive global network of suppliers (Davis, 2016). At the same time, outsourcing business 
operations does not mean outsourcing responsibilities or risks. Companies are expected to be 
accountable for sustainability issues at every stage throughout their supply chain (UN Global 
Compact & BSR, 2015). However, the opacity of global supply chains makes it extremely 
difficult for companies to be accountable for the sustainability practices of their suppliers. This 
reflects a “responsibility paradox” (Davis, Whitman, & Zald, 2013), where the demands for 
corporate sustainability are increasing even though companies’ ability to deliver is shrinking.  
The main culprit behind this responsibility paradox is firms’ inability to completely trace 
their production processes (Kim & Davis, 2016). Gaining full knowledge on a company’s supply 
chain is nearly akin to the finding the Holy Grail; it is simply too challenging to contact hundreds 
of suppliers that one has never heard of. After the Rana Plaza collapsed in 2013 and killed over a 
thousand garment workers in Bangladesh, some global clothing brands were surprised to find out 
that unauthorized sub-contractors were producing their goods. Similarly, even after being given 
more than three years to vet their supply chains and clean their products from the use of conflict 
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materials, the majority of companies admitted they were unable to determine the source of the 
raw minerals contained in their products, citing “the complexity and size of our supply chain” as 
the primary reason for their failure. 
A lion’s share of buyer-supplier relationships is opaque to and hidden from the public. 
However, occasionally these ties become visible. Particularly, the deluge of information and 
communication technologies (ICTs), led by the widespread use of mobile devices and social 
media, has greatly facilitated individuals’ ability to learn and spread information about events 
occurring all over the world. For example, we now know the majority of iPhones are assembled 
by Foxconn because of The New York Times’ series on supply chain worker abuse overseas and 
the ensuing social media buzz about the suicides. Furthermore, ICTs provide a platform through 
which the public can easily mobilize and exert pressure on companies to behave in a more 
accountable and socially responsible fashion (Luo et al., 2016). 
In this chapter, I examine the manner and mechanisms by which mobile phone companies 
respond to social movements targeting their suppliers by disengaging with those suppliers. I 
argue that user-generated social media content such as tweets, blogs, and discussion forum posts 
can help make the buyer-supplier relationship more visible to the public, pushing firms to drop 
protested suppliers from their future supplier base. Furthermore, the geographic diversity of 
social media users influences the degree to which social media content influences buyer-supplier 
relationships. In addition, I explore how the likelihood of buyers’ disengagement from protested 
suppliers is influenced by buyers’ involvement in social supply management initiatives, the 
standardization of their manufacturing processes, as well as the regulatory environment in which 
suppliers are operating. Finally, to check the robustness of these findings, I compare buyers’ 
responses when their suppliers are affected by social movements with their responses when their 
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suppliers are affected by natural disasters, the latter of which represents a destructive exogenous 
shock. 
In exploring these questions, I aim to make several theoretical contributions. First, I seek 
to extend research on network partner selection, which suggests that illegitimate or controversial 
activities play an important role in affecting the dissolution and replacement of ties with 
controversial partners (Jensen, 2006; Jensen & Roy, 2008; Sullivan, Haunschild, & Page, 2007). 
Building on this existing research, my study highlights the important distinction between actual 
and perceived relationships with controversial partners. Recent work has found that even in the 
absence of an actual relationship with a partner, social and geographical proximity to that partner 
may create the façade of a perceived relationship (Greve, Kim, & Teh, 2016; Huang & Li, 2009; 
Jonsson, Greve, & Fujiwara-Greve, 2009). Complementing this work, my study examines what 
happens when an actual relationship with a partner is present, but the perceived relationship with 
a partner is absent. 
Second, I intend to add to the growing research on the role of social media in facilitating 
social movements. The ready accessibility of social media allows people to join a protest and to 
mobilize free-floating individuals without large, centralized organizations (Calhoun, 2013; Earl 
& Kimport, 2011). For example, the Arab Spring protests were enabled by ready access to 
Facebook for organizing and to YouTube for sharing tactics and documenting grievances. What 
remains unclear, however, is whether social media can really yield desirable social movement 
outcomes, since the majority of social media users are “unaffiliated participants” engaging in 
only low-risk behaviors (Mercea, 2012). Against this backdrop, this study presents a model of 
interplay between traditional movement tactics (e.g., sit-in, strike) and internet activism (e.g., 
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posting blogs) where these unaffiliated participants boost the efficacy of traditional protests by 
making the inter-firm relationship with the protest-target visible.   
Finally, I aim to contribute to studies of sustainable supply chain management by 
exploring how social risks and workers’ rights can influence the dynamics of supply chains. The 
concept of sustainability consists of “three pillars”: environment, economy, and social equity — 
the social aspect of sustainability is understudied compared to the rest (see Gold, Seuring, & 
Beske, 2010 for a review). Compared to the growing research on designing green supply chain 
networks that minimize gas emissions or waste, there is significantly less research on designing 
supply chain networks that minimize social risks and protect workers’ rights. Despite the 
negative financial and reputational damages that suppliers’ questionable working condition may 
cause to buyers (Rock, 2003), and the rising efforts to monitor labor conditions along supply 
chains (Short, Toffel, & Hugill, 2016), to date we have mostly anecdotal evidence about whether 
firms actively “weed out” suppliers that do not comply with human and labor rights standards. 
My study attempts to investigate whether firms’ commitment to reducing social risk along their 
supply chain actually affects their decisions to select as well as ditch suppliers. 
ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS AFFECTING SUPPLIER DISENGAGEMENT 
Supplier selection and termination – and outsourcing decisions in general – are primarily 
motivated by the minimization of production costs and the avoidance of unexpected deviation 
from a predetermined production schedule. Other factors include the availability of alternative 
suppliers and transaction-specific know-how, both of which increase search and switching costs 
(Monteverde & Teece, 1982). Relatedly, buyers’ dependence on their suppliers as well as their 
market position help us understand how firms seek to seal off their core technologies from 
environmental influences, manage external control, and deal with potential damage to their 
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public image for keeping or dropping relationships with problematic suppliers (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978; Salancik, 1979; Thompson, 1967). In that sense, buyers should ditch disrupted 
suppliers when the costs of searching for and switching to alternative suppliers of the same input 
are relatively manageable. 
Insights from extant organizational studies on stigma and partner selection suggest that 
buyers would consider walking away from a protested supplier. In particular, when the buyer-
supplier relationship can be revealed to stakeholders, an imminent concern for social evaluation 
arises. Stigma may be transferred to those interacting with stigmatized actors, especially when 
this interaction entails a meaningful relationship (Goffman, 1963). These companions and 
partners can evoke the same social disapproval and negative treatment due to their association 
with stigmatized actors. Transferred stigma and its negative consequences may cause firms to 
avoid relationships with stigmatized suppliers. Indeed, firms often seek to disassociate 
themselves from socially questionable business partners, even those of a high status (Jensen, 
2006), in part to preserve the cognitive legitimacy they possess. For example, when PETA’s 
exposé revealed the inhumane treatment of lambs at Ovis 21, a large network of farms that 
supplies to Stella McCartney and Patagonia, it took less than three business days for both 
companies to cut ties with it (Hendriksz, 2015). 
In addition to stigma concerns, there are immediate financial considerations. Supply 
chain disruptions are notoriously detrimental to buyers’ financial performance, both in the short- 
and long-run (Hendricks & Singhal, 2003, 2005). Protests against a firm are also harmful for 
financial performance (King & Soule, 2007). For example, Rock’s (2003) research on the 
garment industry found that each news article about firms’ sweatshop practices translated into an 
average loss of $70 million in market capitalization. Taken together, provided the availability of 
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alternative suppliers and manageable switch costs, there is compelling reason for buyers to 
disengage from a supplier when the supplier faces a disruption or bad press.  
Again, previous research suggests that suppliers with poor labor conditions will face stiff 
penalty from their buyers. The possibility of disruption in the production process as well as the 
negative press coverage results in a significant financial loss to the buyer.  Buyers are more 
likely to end their relationships with suppliers that harm their business or that damage their trust 
(Hibbard, Kumar, & Stern, 2001). Especially when the costs of searching for and switching to 
alternative suppliers of the same input are relatively manageable (e.g., a disrupted supplier 
produces less specific components and alternative suppliers are available in the industry), it is 
reasonable to expect firms to consider turning to other providers of the same input and prevent 
further financial loss and production disruption (Barrot & Sauvagnat, 2016; Walter, Müller, 
Helfert, & Ritter, 2003).  
Social Media, Link Visibility, and Audience Diversity 
The attention-based view of the firm (Ocasio, 1997) provides a useful framework in terms of 
explaining the impact of stakeholder’s attention on buyer-supplier relationships after supplier 
wrongdoing. The theory’s core argument is that firm behavior is the result of how an 
organization channels and distributes the attention of its decision-makers. What decision-makers 
do depends on what issues and answers they focus their attention on; what issues and answers 
decision-makers focus on, and what they do, depends on the particular context or situation in 
which they find themselves. Therefore, an extension of this theory can be made by positing that 
the attention of decision-makers in a firm is partially determined by outsiders’ or public attention 
that shapes the particular situation in which the firm finds itself.  
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In this vein, the buyer’s decision of whether or not to disengage from protested suppliers 
may be explained by the volume of outsider attention given to the event. The attention that 
stakeholders give to a labor protest shapes how the public thinks about the firm, its values, and 
its belief.  In turn, whether an event receives attention would depend on whether stakeholders 
hold the industry accountable for the event (Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001). In particular, social 
movements targeting a firm typically attempt to change -- normally in a negative fashion -- how 
the public views the targeted firm, so that they can ultimately gain the attention of firm leaders 
(King, 2008; Maguire & Hardy, 2009). For example, boycotted firms are more likely to increase 
their prosocial claims activity after a boycott is announced when the boycott event receives more 
media attention (McDonnell & King, 2013).  
One key factor that magnifies the effect of stakeholders’ attention on firms taking 
responsibility for their suppliers’ labor protest is the extent to which the link between a buyer and 
a supplier is visible to stakeholders. The majority of buyer-supplier relationships are invisible to 
outsiders. Suppliers often sell their products to multiple buyers, and not every buyer gets the 
same level of public scrutiny for questionable labor conditions of its supplier. Attention is 
inherently a scarce resource, requiring an individual to focus on a limited amount of issues while 
being inattentive to the rest (Kahneman, 1973). Supply chain management is not the only factor 
people use to evaluate a firm, partially because information about a firm’s supplier is considered 
less salient than information about the firm itself. In the stock market, for example, investors 
who have limited attention tend to overlook rather than to incorporate news about economically 
related firms, such as their buyers and suppliers (Cohen & Frazzini, 2008). Likewise, despite the 
abundance of actual buyer-supplier relationships, only a subset of relationships are visible to and 
perceived by most people. 
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Link visibility influences stakeholders’ ability to associate an event taking place at the 
supplier’s site with the buyer. Individuals are less punitive for the same event when it occurred to 
a supplier rather than its buyers to the extent that they perceive that the buyer has less 
foreknowledge and/or control over its suppliers (Paharia, Kassam, Greene, & Bazerman, 2009). 
Therefore, when the perceived associations between a firm and its suppliers are weak, the firm 
has an incentive to contract out potential “dirty work” and ship them away to suppliers that 
operate in developing countries, thereby avoiding public scrutiny from the home country on their 
production process (Surroca, Tribó, & Zahra, 2013). Conversely, when outsiders imply a strong 
association between a buyer and its supplier, they are likely to be more punitive towards a buyer 
for not taking action for its supplier’s wrongdoing.  
The perceived strong association between a given firm and its supplier also means that 
the association becomes a more salient issue or category when evaluating the firm. The salience 
or strength of the association, in turn, limits the dilution of the resulting negative social 
evaluation (Vergne, 2012). Co-mentions, references to more than one firm in the same article, 
are shown to be a way to observe the association between firms (Kennedy, 2008). Therefore, I 
argue that the likelihood of a buyer disengaging from a protested supplier, in part, corresponds to 
the prevalence of the information that jointly mentions the buyer and the supplier, highlighting 
the linkage between the two. Through these co-mentions, stakeholders build a high level of 
perceived connectedness between the two, which in turn lead them to attribute direct 
accountability and responsibility to the buyer for its supplier’s wrongdoing. Hence, I predict the 
following: 
Hypothesis 1: The buyer is more likely to disengage from a protested supplier when the 
linkage between that buyer and supplier is highly visible (i.e., more social media posts 
mention a buyer and a supplier in the same article). 
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When is a tweet more likely to gain attention and turn into a buzz? When are social media users 
more likely to digitally participate in a labor protest taking place in China? Most readers of news 
articles or social media articles about a labor protest do not have “a dog in the fight”. In the 
context of labor protests, most social media posts are written by consumers rather than the actual 
factory workers who are physically participating in the protests. These social media users 
normally have few personal connections amongst themselves, let alone with the factory workers. 
Most importantly, the cost of social media users tweeting about a protest is significantly lower 
than the cost of factory workers going on a strike. As much as the factory workers who are 
taking a substantial amount of risk by protesting can utilize social media to organize themselves 
and spread the word, most users who are contributing to the buzz about a protest are “unaffiliated 
participants” engaging in low-risk behavior (Mercea, 2012).  
How does the group structure (or lack thereof) of social media users posting or tweeting 
about a protest influence the buying firm’s decision to engage with or disengage from a 
problematic supplier? Granovetter’s (1978) threshold model of collective behavior posits that 
each individual has a certain threshold at which they will change their behavior (e.g., participate 
in a protest), which is determined by the individual’s assessment of the costs and benefits of 
doing so. He further argues that this cost and benefit assessment is in part dependent on how 
many others are taking action: the cost to an individual of joining a certain collective action 
declines as the size of the collective action increases. Finally, when there are enough people to 
reach “critical mass”, i.e., enough people who choose to make contributions to the collective 
action while the majority do little or nothing, a social movement can have an exponential growth 
in terms of its impact (Oliver, Marwell, & Teixeira, 1985).  
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Research on critical mass consistently documents that the diversity or heterogeneity in 
the population lowers the bar to reach this critical mass since with a high level of diversity or 
heterogeneity, fewer contributors may be needed to provide a good to larger groups, making 
collective action less risky, costly, and complex (Oliver & Marwell, 1988). Furthermore, the 
diversity within the population yields different, non-redundant sets of knowledge and tactics. The 
richness of their repertoire expands the movement’s organizing capacity (Dutta, 2016) as well as 
its appeal to different constituencies (Olzak & Ryo, 2007). For example, the attention from social 
media may be more powerful when the attention is coming from a variety of geographical 
regions, and when it is communicated in various languages. Therefore, controlling for the 
volume of social media posts mentioning a supplier, I argue that the geographic diversity of the 
social media users who are paying attention to a given buyer-supplier relationship may be critical 
in predicting the effectiveness of supplier-targeting social movements.  
Hypothesis 2: The buyer is more likely to disengage from a protested supplier when the 
social media posts mentioning a supplier originate from many geographies. 
 
Technological Standardization 
Historically, the use of machine tools has been used to increase managerial control, allowing 
factories to rely less on workers’ tacit knowledge and manual skills (Noble, 1979). The use of 
machinery and equipment contributes to suppliers’ competitiveness and sustainability.  As 
factories increase their reliance on automation and machinery, production technologies typically 
become progressively standardized. Particularly, new technologies allow the automation of 
enterprise business processes, providing greater traceability and reliability in terms of the 
production process as well as outcome (Chen, 2014; Qiu, 2007).  
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However, technological standardization may hinder the durability of buyer-supplier 
relationships.  Suppliers that manufacture standardized items offer little competitive advantage 
over their competitors, making them “arms‐length” suppliers. In turn, under the “arm's length” 
model, buyers typically maintain multiple suppliers, and avoid long term commitments and 
regular price reviews (Dyer, Cho, & Chu, 1998; Power, 2005). Technological standardization 
means that multiple suppliers of equivalent components conform to the same technological 
standard, and buyers of these components invest significant resources in learning to absorb and 
use the standardized production technology (Tassey, 2000). When multiple suppliers adopt the 
same technological standard, they become more interchangeable and replaceable from the 
perspective of the buyer. Buyers can easily switch between suppliers who conform to the same 
standard without incurring significant switching or learning costs. Standardization also means 
less reliance on tacit, firm-specific knowledge that may reside within any one worker or group of 
workers (Lecuona & Reitzig, 2014). Therefore, when a supplier experiences a labor protest, the 
buyer can disengage from that supplier without losing the particular insights and knowledge that 
are tightly intertwined with the experience of working with the protested supplier. 
In other words, when a supplier automates its production process through the use of 
machinery, its work is more highly standardized, and buyers can disengage from that supplier 
without incurring significant switching and learning costs, or losing tacit, firm-specific 
knowledge. However, when the supplier’s work relies heavily on manual labor, then switching to 
another supplier entails significant switching and learning costs, as well as the loss of tacit, firm-
specific knowledge. Therefore, I posit: 
Hypothesis 3: A buyer is more likely to disengage from a protested supplier when the 
supplier’s work is highly standardized (i.e., a component is inserted by machine rather 
than by hand). 
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Corporate Social Responsibility and Workers’ Rights 
The stakeholder theory of corporate social responsibility emphasizes a broad set of social 
responsibilities for businesses, including responsibility for their suppliers along their supply 
chains (Freeman, 1984). Sustainable supply chain management represents the management of 
material and information flows while integrating the ‘triple-bottom-line’ concept that takes the 
three dimensions of sustainable development (economic, environmental, and social) into account 
(Seuring & Müller, 2008). In particular, supplier monitoring programs or training programs often 
enable buyers to reduce social risks along their supply chains. Common indicators of social risks 
include poor working conditions, the use of child or forced labor, lack of a living, fair or 
minimum wage, etc. 
Companies voluntarily participate in these CSR programs for various reasons. They may 
participate in such programs in order to improve their image or strategically appeal to socially 
concerned customers. Regardless of their motivation, voluntary participation in social supply 
chain management programs allow companies to have more relevant knowledge and experience, 
which in turn enables companies to build the capacity to understand and address sustainability 
issues along their supply chains faster and better (Bansal & Roth, 2000; Carter, 2005; Hart, 
1995). At the minimum, these companies are more likely to measure and keep track of 
information related to their suppliers (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2014).  
In addition, the public commitment to CSR can also be a burden, in the sense that a firm 
has now raised external stakeholders’ expectations for it to be a socially responsible company, 
and this can backfire if it does not deal with unsustainable practices. This argument is in line 
with recent findings in reputation research that suggests good reputation is more likely to become 
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a burden, rather than a benefit, when considering support from external stakeholders following a 
negative event (Zavyalova, Pfarrer, Reger, & Hubbard, 2016). Companies that participate in 
CSR programs need to be more proactive in addressing supply chain sustainability issues in 
order to avoid the harsh penalties that typically arise when companies that are known for being 
socially responsible are targeted by social movements (King & McDonnell, 2015). By refusing 
to terminate relationships with protested suppliers, or take any other actions that might reduce 
the stain of association with protested suppliers, buyers may unintentionally convey to 
stakeholders that they are in fact responsible for the labor protest (Sutton & Callahan, 1987). 
Such a response may be seen as an evasion of responsibility and a rejection of efforts to ensure 
fairness across stakeholders, leading to a loss of legitimacy (Lamin & Zaheer, 2012). Therefore, 
when a supplier experiences a labor protest, buyers that participate in social supply chain 
management programs are better able and more motivated to reduce social risk along their 
supply chains and thus more likely to disengage from the protested supplier. 
Hypothesis 4: A buyer that voluntarily participates in social supply chain management 
programs is more likely to disengage from a protested supplier. 
 
Not all workers reside in places where they have the rights to organize and strike. Even in states 
that see these rights as constitutional, not all strikes are legal. The extent to which workers’ rights 
are protected is associated with the level of political opportunity, or “the probability that social 
protest actions will lead to success in achieving a desired outcome” (Goldstone & Tilly, 2001: 
182). Regulatory environment, as a result, has a big impact on the frequency and salience of 
protests. In states that protect the right to engage in political activities and freedom of association 
rights, workers have more access to political opportunity structures.  Political opportunity 
structures motivate people to participate in social movements (Tarrow, 1994) and allow social 
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movements to have a stronger impact on their targets (King, 2008; Soule, 2012). Therefore, in 
states where workers’ rights are strongly protected, workers are more likely to take advantage of 
the abundant political opportunities available to them and thus are more likely to actively 
participate in labor protests to voice their grievances. Conversely, for workers in states where 
their rights are restricted, there is not much they can do to bring about a change in their 
circumstances even when they experience work-related grievances.  
As a result, labor protests are likely to be ubiquitous or inevitable events in states where 
workers have a high level of political opportunity, but they are likely to be relatively rare in 
states where workers have a low level of political opportunity. When the suppliers operate in a 
state that protects workers’ rights, due to the normalization and routinization of protests (Meyer 
& Tarrow, 1998; Oliver & Maney, 2000), buyers might become desensitized to protests targeting 
their suppliers and be less motivated to respond to those protests. In contrast, in states where 
workers’ rights are restricted, when suppliers become targets of a labor protest, buyers are likely 
to interpret the rare event as much more significant and disruptive, and therefore have more 
incentive to disengage from with those suppliers. Therefore, I predict the following:  
Hypothesis 5: A buyer is more likely to disengage from a protested supplier to the extent 
that supplier-side workers’ rights are restricted as opposed to protected. 
 
DATA, MEASURES, AND METHODS 
As detailed in Chapter Two, to capture fine-grained buyer-supplier relationships in the global 
mobile handset industry, I extracted each component’s maker (suppliers) information from 
individual model’s bill-of-materials compiled by Information Handling Services (IHS). This 
company buys electronic products and breaks them down to trace their component suppliers. 
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Each phone contains hundreds of components. Once the IHS technicians decompose a phone into 
its components, they extract the lot number assigned to each component and verify the 
component’s supplier name, function, and specification. I obtained all mobile handset teardown 
reports published by IHS until 2014, which yielded 399 models. On average, a mobile phone in 
my sample consists of 290 components, with a standard deviation of 130. 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in this study is supplier disengagement at the buyer-supplier dyad level, 
computed as a binary variable that takes the value of 1 when a buyer has ceased to include a 
given first-tier supplier from its supply base for at least the next three mobile phone releases, and 
0 otherwise. To calculate this variable, I first constructed a matrix where each row represents a 
model release date – buyer – supplier triad. When a buyer released more than two phones in a 
given month, I combined their supply chain networks, treating them as buying for a single 
product. The maximum observed value for the number of new phones released in a given month 
was four. Then, I tracked whether a buyer had a component supplied by its existing suppliers in 
its individual products. Given that most phones have a market life cycle of nine to twelve months 
(Entner, 2011), having a value of 1 in this study’s dependent variable translates into a given 
buyer-supplier dyad not being renewed for at least the next two to three years.  
In supplementary analyses, I also used different thresholds to determine whether a tie has 
dissolved, ranging from the next release to the next ten releases. Although the number of 
available dyads decreases when imposing a stricter threshold (e.g., mobile phone brands that 
have not released at least ten mobile handsets will be omitted if the threshold is set at 10), my 




Labor protest. The key independent variable of this study, labor protest, is a binary variable that 
takes the value of 1 if a supplier was targeted for a labor protest within a 3-month window 
leading up to a product release, and 0 otherwise. The choice of the 3-month period was chosen to 
adjust for the conventional minimum notice period for contract termination and mobile handset 
release cycle (cf. Joseph, Klingebiel, & Wilson, 2016). That is, a buyer is relatively constrained 
to immediately remove a protested supplier from its production process if a protest occurs within 
this period. As a result, if a buyer decides to remove a protested supplier, such a decision will 
more likely to occur when it reaches out to potential suppliers that will be a part of the 
production process of the subsequent model. I obtained each model’s product release date from 
IHS’s executive summary report, measured at the year-month level.  
The primary source of protest events comes from all daily published and English-written 
newspapers indexed by Factiva, using “All publications” as the source category from the 
platform. Using newspaper data on protest events is one of the most frequently used forms of 
data in the field of social movements, and newspapers are generally considered to be an accurate 
source in terms of the veracity of event coverage (Earl, Martin, McCarthy, & Soule, 2004).  For 
all instances where a supplier name and a set of keywords (e.g., protest, labor strike, unrest) co-
occurred, a group of research assistants manually verified and entered the company name, event 
date, and the nature of the event into my database. Given my focus on supplier-targeting labor 
protests (i.e., not consumers or activists boycotting the buyer), the majority of identified events 
were caused by factory workers demanding a better severance package, higher wage, or working 
condition, or objecting to layoffs. 
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However, only a proportion of all public demonstrations receive any media attention. 
Some protests are deemed to be more “newsworthy.” This newsworthiness is often related to 
various factors including the news agency reporting on the event, violence at the event, and the 
size/intensity of the event (see Earl et al., 2004 for a review). In addition, the majority of 
newspapers indexed by Factiva were written in English, raising another source of potential 
selection bias from focusing only on English news outlets.  
Social movements researchers suggest that activist-based web sources tend to report a 
greater number of protests compared to newspapers (Almeida & Lichbach, 2003), thus I tried to 
reduce the sample selection bias by considering both conventional media sources (e.g., 
newspapers) and activist-based web sources to capture the occurrence of protests. I corroborated 
my database with two crowd-mapped data sets on labor strikes in China (China Labour Bulletin; 
China Strike) as well as MediaGaon, a media portal that archives over 50 Korean news outlets. 
In addition, two Chinese-speaking research assistants searched the occurrence of protest events 
for China- and Taiwan-based suppliers through internet search. These extensive data collection 
attempts to maximize the coverage of labor protest occurrence in China, South Korea, and 
Taiwan. Suppliers based in these three countries together account for three-quarters of the market 
entrants in the mobile handset industry (Alcacer & Oxley, 2014).  
In the final sample, 48% of the labor protests pertained to a demand for a higher wage 
and better working conditions. Another 46% of the labor protests are related to a firm’s decision 
such as an announcement to close a factory or lay off workers. The remaining 6% of the labor 
protests resulted in lockouts but were not directly targeted at the management. These protests 
were aimed at addressing social issues or governmental policies. Controlling for the nature of the 
protest did not alter the regression results. Across all labor protests, there was only one case  that 
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had a report of a death, which was caused by a worker committing suicide to protest low wages. 
There was no report of the police opening fire at the protesters in any of the protests in my 
sample. 
Link visibility. To capture the extent to which a given buyer and supplier relationship is visible 
to stakeholders, I measured the frequency of social media posts that connect the buyer with the 
protested supplier. Specifically, link visibility is the natural logarithm of the number of social 
media posts that mention a given buyer-supplier dyad together within a 6-month window starting 
from 9-month prior to a product release to 3-month leading up to a product release. The overall 
results are very similar even if I include the 3-month period leading up to a product release, 
during which I measure the presence of labor protests. Here, I show the results excluding the 3-
month period to avoid potential confounding between the two measures. 
Using Crimson Hexagon’s ForSight social media analysis platform, I first gathered social 
media posts mentioning either a buyer or a supplier, resulting in 2.9 billion social media posts. 
ForSight indexes a massive amount of past social media posts dating back to 2008, and thus 
social media data are only available for the post-2008 period. After filtering out ‘off-topic’ posts 
(e.g., a tweet mentioning the fruit, not the company Apple) through the platform’s BrightView 
algorithm, 5.7 million posts were assigned to be relevant posts. To adjust for the sheer increase 
in social media volume since 2008, I took a random sample of 10,000 posts per month when 
there were more than 10,000 relevant posts in that month. ForSight social media analysis 
platform currently limits the data that can be exported to 10,000 posts per API call, wherein a 
user specifies the start date and end date for each export call. I made a separate export call for 
each month. After, removing posts that were deleted by their author, my current sample yielded 
781,991 posts.  
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In the initial sample that indexes all posts that mention either a buyer or a supplier’s name 
(N= 2.9 billion), the majority of the social media posts were from Twitter (81%), followed by 
forums (9%), blogs (6%), and public Facebook posts (4%). After removing ‘off-topic’ posts, the 
sample size decreased to 5.7 million, and the composition of sources substantially changed: now 
79% of the relevant user-generated contents were from blogs, followed by forums (18%), while 
tweets and public Facebook posts account for 1%, respectively. The substantial reduction of 
Twitter posts in the final sample is partially due to the fact that most machine-learning 
algorithms, including BrightView algorithm, use the characteristics of other words appearing in 
the same document or post. In my empirical context, Twitter’s 140-character limit makes it 
difficult to assign a tweet into a category with certainty, especially when a supplier has a long or 
generic name. Finally, I created a 47 (buyers) x 405 (suppliers) co-occurrence matrix where each 
cell represents the logged frequency of social media posts mentioning a buyer and a supplier 
together during the three months leading up to a product release. 
Audience geographic diversity. Given that social media presumes authors’ anonymity, 
measuring the diversity of authors imposes a challenge on researchers. One viable solution is to 
take advantage of the location in which a social media post is published. About 8% of social 
media posts in my sample have valid geographic information, either extracted from user profiles 
or geospatial metadata (geotags) associated with a post. Although plausible, to my knowledge, 
there is no empirical evidence that social media users’ location influences the likelihood of them 
reporting the location or the precision with which they report it, which will create a non-response 
bias (Takhteyev, Gruzd, & Wellman, 2012). Another potential source of bias, which my data 
cannot rule out, stems from limiting my search to social media posts written in English and 
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excluding certain social media platforms that are popular in non-English-speaking countries (e.g., 
China’s Sina Weibo and Russia’s VKontakte).  
I calculated audience geographic diversity for each supplier-release date as the entropy 
measure of geographic diversity of the social media posts. After removing all social media posts 
without authors’ geographic information, I calculated the entropy measure of audience 
geographic diversity: 
𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑔𝑒𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 = ∑ 𝑃𝑖ln (1/𝑃𝑖) 
where Pi is the proportion of supplier-mentioning social media posts originating from country I 
within a 6-month window starting from 9-month prior to a product release to 3-month leading up 
to a product release. In supplementary analyses, I replaced this entropy measure with its 
exponentiated value, thus making it the Shannon diversity measure (Shannon & Weaver, 1949), 
and found no systematic difference in the results in terms of the sign and significance of 
coefficients.  
Technological standardization. I measured the supplier’s level of technological standardization 
using the information on insert method for an individual component. I defined technological 
standardization as a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if all of the components supplied by 
a supplier to a buyer was inserted by machine, and 0 if at least one of the components required 
insertion by hand. Insertion by machine does not imply a fully automated production process; 
instead, it means that a worker uses a machine to insert a component into a phone. During the 
observation period, starting in 2002, less than 30% of the components required insertion by hand, 
and there was no upward linear trend in terms of the proportion of components being inserted by 
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machine. I obtained this information from individual mobile phones’ bill-of-materials compiled 
by IHS.  
Social supply chain management program. I measured a buyer’s commitment to supply chain 
sustainability by capturing whether the company has implemented any initiatives to reduce social 
risks in its supply chain, where social risks include poor working conditions, the use of child or 
forced labor, lack of a living, fair or minimum wage, etc. Subsequently, I defined social supply 
chain management (SCM) program as a binary variable that takes the value of 1 when a buyer 
has explicitly and publicly disclosed any such efforts at the time of a product release, and 0 
otherwise. I obtained this information from Bloomberg Environment, Social and Governance 
(ESG) database.  Bloomberg collects ESG information from company-sourced fillings including 
sustainability or CSR reports, annual reports, company websites, as well as a proprietary 
Bloomberg survey that requests corporate data directly from the companies. In contrast to other 
data providers, Bloomberg does not estimate or derive from mathematical models any of the 
ESG data, making it a preferable choice when comparing before and after a company has 
adopted social supply chain management programs (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2014). 
Workers’ rights. To examine whether a labor protest targeting a supplier was legal in its 
regulatory environment, I computed workers’ rights, using data from the Cingranelli-Richards 
(CIRI) Human Rights Data Project (Cingranelli, Richards, & Clay, 2014). According to a human 
rights and labor rights perspective, workers should have freedom of association at their 
workplaces and the right to bargain collectively with their employers. CIRI workers’ rights score 
indicates the extent to which workers enjoy these and other internationally recognized rights at 
work, including a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor; a minimum 
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age for the employment of children; and acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum 
wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health.  
This variable thus measures the extent to which supplier-side workers’ rights were legally 
protected at the time of a product release, and takes one out of three values. A score of 0 
indicates that workers’ rights were severely restricted; a score of 1 indicates that workers’ rights 
were somewhat restricted; and a score of 2 indicates that workers’ rights were fully protected. 
When a supplier had factories across multiple countries, I took the average CIRI workers’ rights 
score, weighted by the number of factories in each country, and then recoded it to the nearest 
integer (between 0, 1, and 2). CIRI scores are assigned at the country-year level, and are 
available up to 2011. I used the 2011 information for the 2011–2014 period. 
Natural disaster. To check whether a buyer-supplier dyad is affected in the aftermath of an 
exogenous and costly shock, I created a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if a supplier’s 
factory is affected by a natural disaster within a 1-year window leading up to a product release, 
and 0 otherwise. I obtained the natural disaster data from Centre for Research on the 
Epidemiology of Disasters (2014). Over 800 recorded natural disasters occurred between 2002 
and 2014. To focus on disasters that caused a significant level of damage and also to match the 
relative frequency of disasters with that of labor protests, my current analyses only include 
natural disasters that caused more than 100 human fatalities and USD 1 million of economic 
damage. Using each supplier’s headquarter and factory addresses, I checked whether each 
individual address was located in the region in which the disaster occurred. To define the 
boundary of regions, I used the ISO 3166-2 subdivision codes. These codes uniquely identify the 
principal subdivisions (e.g., provinces or states) of all countries coded by the International 
Organization for Standardization.  
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Control Variables 
I included two control variables in the analyses to account for the dependence between a buyer 
and a supplier and potential switch costs. First, the percentage of production cost is the dollar 
amount a buyer paid a supplier (including labor cost) divided by the production cost for a given 
mobile phone, and then multiplied by 100. The greater the percentage of purchases made to a 
supplier, the greater the buyer’s dependence on the buyer (Provan & Gassenheimer, 1994). In 
additional analyses, I replaced this variable with the absolute dollar amount a buyer spent on a 
supplier for a given model. These two variables were strongly correlated (r=0.89, p<0.01), and 
yielded similar regression results. Second, the number of alternative suppliers measures the size 
of the supplier pool a buyer can choose from for a particular component. A large pool of supplier 
candidates provides a buyer with leverage over its suppliers and also reduces the search and 
switch costs for choosing a new supplier. Conversely, the limited availability of alternative 
suppliers constrains the ability of a buyer to reselect another supplier, forcing the buyer to 
reinvest in extant relationships (Hart & Saunders, 1997). To calculate this variable, I first 
counted the number of active suppliers in a given year, grouped by component function. Each 
component was classified into one of five categories: main printed circuit board (PCB), display 
(e.g., LCD screen), camera, battery, and supporting items (e.g., accessories). To adjust for the 
positively skewed distribution of this variable, I took its natural logarithm and assigned the value 
to its corresponding supplier-release date. For example, in 2012, there were 23 suppliers 
available for the mobile phone camera; this variable takes the value of ln(23)=3.14. 
 Previous research suggests co-mentions in the newspapers are a good proxy to show that 
covered companies are embedded in a market network, which also reflects how people are 
defining and interpreting the market concept as a whole (Kennedy, 2008; Navis & Glynn, 2010). 
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To control for the legitimizing effect of co-mentions in newspapers, co-mention in newspapers 
was measured in the same way as one of my key independent variable link visibility, with one 
notable difference. While link visibility uses user-generated social media data as its source, this 
variable takes the natural logarithm of the number of newspaper articles mentioning a buyer and 
a supplier together in the same article during a 6-month window. All newspapers that are 
included in Lexis-Nexis’s “major newspapers” group were used to create the buyer-supplier co-
occurrence matrix. Lexis-Nexis defines major newspapers to be listed in the top 50 circulation in 
Editor & Publisher Year Book for United States newspapers. For the newspapers published 
outside the United States, they must be written in English language and listed as a national 
newspaper in Benn's World Media Directory or one of the top 5% in circulation for the country. 
The list of newspapers that were included in this group source and also appeared in my data is 
shown in Table 7 in the Appendix at the end of this chapter. 
 Link visibility (co-mentioning a buyer and a supplier) is a subset of social media posts 
mentioning a given supplier. Unlike buyers (e.g., Apple, Samsung) that normally receive media 
attention, both in social media and newspapers, suppliers are typically unknown to lay people. At 
the same time, some mobile handset suppliers such as Texas Instruments or Seiko Epson 
Corporation receive a significant amount of attention. Therefore, I controlled for supplier node 
visibility which takes the natural logarithm of value of the number of social media posts that 
mention a given supplier within a 6-month window starting from 9-month prior to a product 
release to 3-month leading up to a product release. 
Finally, I created a binary variable smartphone that takes the value of 1 if a supplier 
provided components for a smartphone, and 0 for a feature phone. This variable accounts for the 
possibility that the transition from feature phones to smartphones serves as a technological 
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discontinuity. Such a technological breakthrough may push firms to allocate excessive focus on 
short-term over long-term activities (Vuori & Huy, 2016), and may reduce a buyer’s dependence 
on its existing suppliers in the face of a new dominant design (Tushman & Anderson, 1986).  
Estimation 
This study’s unit of analysis is a buyer–supplier dyad, and each dyad is repeated as many times 
as the number of times a buyer purchased components from a buyer to produce a different 
mobile phone since 2002. Reliable, comprehensive social media data were only available in the 
post-2008 period. Therefore I restricted my analyses to the post-2008 period when testing 
Hypotheses 1 and 2, and used all observations when testing Hypotheses 3, 4, and 5. 
Given that the dependent variable in this study, supplier disengagement, is a binary 
variable, I used a conditional logistic regression with dyadic fixed effects for buyer-supplier 
pairings to test my hypotheses. The use of dyadic fixed effects controls for any time-invariant, 
unobserved effects between a buyer-supplier dyad. In additional analyses, I also re-ran all 
models using a conditional logistic regression with dyadic fixed effects for buyer-year pairings, 
thus only using the variance within a buyer’s multiple suppliers in a given year for estimation. I 
found little systematic difference in the results. In all models, I computed robust standard errors 
adjusted for clustering at the buyer–supplier parings.  
RESULTS 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations for all variables included in the 
analyses.  Most correlations shown in Table 1 are low in magnitude, except for among three 
variables using social media data (link visibility, audience geographic diversity, and supplier 
node visibility) and newspaper data (co-mention in newspapers). I further checked for 
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multicollinearity by computing the variance inflation factors (VIFs) and condition numbers. VIFs 
and condition numbers in all models without interaction terms were smaller than 4. In 
supplementary analyses, I removed highly correlated variables one at a time and found consistent 
results for my key predictors. These results suggest that multicollinearity was not likely to be a 
significant issue in my models. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations  
Panel A: Using post-2008 observations  
  
Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1) Supplier disengagement 0.20 0.40 
            (2) Labor protest 0.01 0.10 -0.02 
           (3) Natural disaster 0.01 0.10 -0.05 -0.01 
          (4) Link visibility a 1.83 2.16 -0.07 0.08 0.07 
         (5) Audience geographic diversity a 1.74 1.58 -0.07 0.00 0.07 0.44 
        (6) Technological standardization 0.86 0.35 -0.06 0.04 0.01 -0.07 -0.06 
       (7) Social SCM program 0.43 0.49 -0.14 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.31 0.04 
      (8) Workers' rights 0.92 0.79 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.07 0.21 0.02 
     (9) Percentage of production cost 1.16 2.71 0.04 -0.04 0.01 0.03 -0.05 -0.29 -0.03 -0.10 
    (10) Number of alternative suppliers 4.66 0.51 -0.08 -0.03 0.07 -0.08 -0.03 0.17 0.02 0.09 -0.05 
   (11) Co-mention in newspapers 0.71 1.28 0.00 0.11 0.10 0.69 0.30 -0.04 -0.04 0.06 -0.03 -0.13 
  (12) Supplier node visibility a 3.83 2.47 -0.06 0.04 0.05 0.80 0.48 -0.11 0.03 -0.06 0.14 -0.19 0.66 
 (13) Smartphone 0.89 0.31 -0.15 0.03 0.04 0.14 0.14 -0.02 0.16 -0.08 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 0.09 
 
Panel B: Using all observations  
  
Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1) Supplier disengagement 0.19 0.39 
         (2) Labor protest 0.01 0.08 -0.03 
        (3) Natural disaster 0.01 0.08 -0.02 -0.01 
       (4) Technological standardization  0.89 0.32 -0.05 0.02 0.02 
      (5) Social SCM program 0.36 0.48 -0.16 0.05 0.02 -0.04 
     (6) Workers' rights 1.03 0.82 0.00 -0.04 -0.02 0.18 -0.03 
    (7) Percentage of production cost 1.67 3.71 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.12 -0.08 -0.08 
   (8) Number of alternative suppliers 4.61 0.55 -0.14 -0.02 0.03 0.12 0.14 0.09 0.02 
  (9) Co-mention in newspapers 0.85 1.41 -0.01 0.10 0.08 0.01 -0.03 0.04 0.27 -0.09 
 (10) Smartphone 0.58 0.49 -0.20 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.30 -0.08 -0.08 0.18 -0.06 
Note: 
a Data only available for the post-2008 period. 
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Tables 2, 3, 4 show the results of the conditional logistic regression on supplier disengagement. 
Models shown in Tables 2 and 3 only use the post-2008 observations, where social media data 
are available. Models in Table 4 use all observations from 2002 to 2014. Model 1 in all three 
tables presents the results of the baseline model. Throughout all models, both availability of 
alternative suppliers and the buyer’s dependence on a particular supplier do not show any 
systematic pattern with the likelihood of supplier disengagement. Compared to feature phones, I 
find that for smartphone models, buyers are less likely to disengage from protested suppliers. 
This can be partially explained by the fact that smartphones are newer, and thus buyers are less 
likely to disengage from protested suppliers compared to when older feature phones are involved. 
I find a marginally significant, negative main effect of supplier node visibility, suggesting that 
suppliers that have a greater presence in the social media are less likely to be removed from their 
extant partners’ supplier base.  
Results of Model 2 in both tables show no significant main effect of supplier-targeting 
labor protests. In some models with an interaction term, the coefficient estimate of the labor 
protests becomes statistically significant as if suppliers being targeted for labor protests help 
them continue to supply for their extant partners. It is plausible to imagine buyers may prefer a 
manageable amount of labor protests occurring at their suppliers’ factories if those protests are 
an inevitable consequence of cost-saving efforts and the disruption to the production process is 
temporary and bearable. However, I do not find empirical support to show that protests against 
low wage are meaningfully different from protests for other causes in terms of their impact on a 
buyer’s decision to disengage from a protested supplier. In addition, the combined effect of labor 
protests (due to its main effect as well as interaction effect) yields little increase in the likelihood 
of a buyer to disengage from a protested supplier. 
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In Model 3 (Table 2), I find a negative and statistically significant interaction between 
labor protest and link visibility, finding support for Hypothesis 1. Figure 13 illustrates the 
interaction effect, holding other variables at the mean values. Link visibility increases the 
likelihood of supplier disengagement when a supplier was a target of labor protests, even after 
controlling for the supplier node visibility. Figure 13 also reveals that buyers only decide to 
disengage from protested suppliers when their relationships are highly visible in social media. In 
my sample, about a quarter of the dyads (23.31%) are not jointly mentioned in the social media 
throughout the observation period. Companies rarely disengage from suppliers if the labor 
protest was unnoticed in social media even it was reported in newspapers. In fact, co-mentions in 
newspapers, which follows the same operationalization with link visibility (in the social media) 




Table 2. Conditional Fixed-Effects Logit Regression on Supplier Disengagement 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
          
Percentage of production cost 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 
 
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) 
Number of alternative suppliers -0.247 -0.243 -0.243 -0.243 
 
(0.241) (0.245) (0.247) (0.245) 
Co-mention in newspapers 0.147 0.174 0.174 0.172 
 
(0.217) (0.217) (0.217) (0.216) 
Supplier node visibility -0.230+ -0.229+ -0.225+ -0.229+ 
 
(0.126) (0.126) (0.127) (0.126) 
Smartphone -0.743** -0.729** -0.731** -0.727** 
 
(0.279) (0.280) (0.280) (0.279) 
     Buyer-supplier fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
     Link visibility 0.067 0.069 0.062 0.068 
 
(0.097) (0.096) (0.098) (0.096) 
Audience geographic diversity -0.181* -0.188* -0.182* -0.186* 
 
(0.081) (0.084) (0.082) (0.083) 
Labor protest  
 
-0.945 -6.541* 5.860* 
  
(0.794) (2.941) (2.466) 




   
(0.543) 
-6.709** 
Labor protest x  
          Audience geographic diversity 
   
    
(0.298) 
     Observations 985 985 985 985 
Wald chi2 29.30 32.34 35.81 744.3 
Notes:  
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by buyer-supplier dyads. Observations are limited to the post-2008 
period, when social media data become available. 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed) 
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Figure 13. The Effect of Link Visibility with or without Labor Protests 
 
 
The current measure of link visibility does not include social media posts published after a 
protest event has occurred. However, the results are remarkably similar even when I use social 
media co-mentions that were posted after the protest event and before the product release. In 
Table 3, I re-ran all models shown in Table 2 using a different time window to measure link 
visibility. Now the variable measures the natural logarithm of the number of social media posts 
that mention a given buyer-supplier dyad together within a 6-month window leading up to a 
product release. The overall results are very similar even when I include the 3-month period 
leading up to a product release, during which I measure the presence of labor protests. When I 
limit the window to a 3-month period leading up to a product release and thus have a complete 
overlap with the window I use to measure the occurrence of labor protests, the interaction term 
between labor protest and link visibility is positive and statistically significant at the α=0.05 level. 
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Therefore, these findings suggest that the link visibility driven by social media can shed light on 
supply chain dynamics in the aftermath of social movements.  
 
Table 3. Conditional Fixed-Effects Logit Regression on Supplier Disengagement 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
          
Percentage of production cost 0.022 0.021 0.022 0.021 
 
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
Number of alternative suppliers -0.252 -0.248 -0.245 -0.248 
 
(0.248) (0.253) (0.254) (0.252) 
Co-mention in newspapers 0.137 0.155 0.131 0.151 
 
(0.219) (0.221) (0.221) (0.221) 
Supplier node visibility -0.212 -0.213 -0.207 -0.212 
 
(0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) 
Smartphone -0.709* -0.696* -0.701* -0.695* 
 
(0.277) (0.278) (0.279) (0.278) 
     Buyer-supplier fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
     Link visibility a 0.037 0.041 0.033 0.040 
 
(0.181) (0.181) (0.181) (0.181) 
Audience geographic diversity -0.176* -0.182* -0.176* -0.180* 
 
(0.082) (0.084) (0.082) (0.084) 
Labor protest  
 
-0.912 -6.718* 6.029 
  
(0.786) (3.242) (3.688) 




   
(0.571) 
 Labor protest x  
          Audience geographic diversity 
   
-6.837** 
    
(0.307) 
     Observations 985 985 985 985 
Wald chi2 27.79 30.79 34.89 690.8 
Notes:  
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by buyer-supplier dyads. Observations are limited to the post-2008 
period, when social media data become available. 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed) 
a Link visibility is measured using a 6-month window leading up to a product release. 
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Contrary to Hypothesis 2 where I predicted that a buyer is more likely to disengage from a 
protested supplier when social media posts originate from geographically diverse locations, the 
result in Model 4 (Tables 2 and 3) suggests the opposite: as social media posts mentioning a 
supplier originates from many geographies, a buyer is substantially less likely to disengage from 
the protested supplier. One plausible explanation is that firms pay more attention to social media 
posts written by users in rich, developed countries. However, this pattern is consistent even when 
I remove all social media posts coming from the United States, which accounts for more than 
half of social media volume. Another plausible explanation is that the digital transition has 
allowed people to rapidly gather virtually and participate in the online debate without needing to 
be all present in-person in one physical location, making social media forums a global, 
geography-free space (Silverstone, 2006; Weichert, 2016). As anyone who wants to be involved 
in the online discussion can publish, interact, and debate within an imaginary but nonetheless 
real communication space, the diversity of the people engaging in social media – especially their 
geographic location – may have insignificant impact compared to their collective volume. As 
shown in Figure 14, the significant interaction between audience geographic diversity and labor 
protests is mainly driven by instances where all social media posts originated from a single 
country (even it is not the United States) compared to coming from multiple countries.  
 
 60 
Figure 14. The Effect of Audience Geographic Diversity with or without Labor Protests 
 
 
In subsequent analyses, I found that the sheer volume of supplier-mentioning social media posts, 
ignoring geotag information, also substantially reduces the likelihood of supplier disengagement: 
a buyer is reluctant to disengage from a protested supplier when the supplier has a high social 
media profile. However, the buyer becomes prone to disengaging from that supplier as its 
linkage with the protested supplier gains attention on social media. 
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Table 4. Conditional Fixed-Effects Logit Regression on Supplier Disengagement 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
            
Percentage of production cost 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.023 
 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Number of alternative suppliers -0.084 -0.086 -0.086 -0.085 -0.085 
 
(0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) 
Co-mention in newspapers -0.142 -0.137 -0.138 -0.135 -0.134 
 
(0.138) (0.139) (0.139) (0.139) (0.139) 
Smartphone -0.873** -0.870** -0.871** -0.868** -0.870** 
 
(0.160) (0.160) (0.160) (0.160) (0.160) 
      
Buyer-supplier fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included 
 
     Technological standardization -0.051 -0.045 -0.053 -0.031 -0.055 
 (0.294) (0.292) (0.292) (0.294) (0.291) 
Social SCM program -1.565** -1.562** -1.562** -1.558** -1.557** 
 (0.206) (0.206) (0.206) (0.205) (0.206) 
Workers' rights 0.180 0.167 0.169 0.177 0.177 
 (0.198) (0.198) (0.198) (0.198) (0.198) 
Labor protest  
 
-0.687 -10.731** -0.116 -0.136 
  
(1.064) (1.017) (1.137) (1.184) 
Labor protest x  




   
(1.450) 
  Labor protest x  
          Social SCM program 
   
-12.789** 
 
    
(1.274) 
 Labor protest x Workers' rights 
    
-11.557** 
     
(1.266) 
      Observations 2,898 2,898 2,898 2,898 2,898 
Wald chi2 143.5 144.2 251.6 824.6 885 
Notes:  
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by buyer-supplier dyads.  
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed) 
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In Model 3 (Table 4), I find a significant interaction between labor protests and suppliers’ 
technological standardization. It is plausible to argue that the supplier’s technological 
standardization should make that supplier a more reliable partner and more replaceable. However, 
now labor protests have a negative, significant main effect, essentially balancing out this positive 
interaction.  
As indicated by the negative and statistically significant main effect of social SCM 
program in Model 4 (Table 4), buyers that implemented a social supply chain management 
program tend to refrain from disengaging from protested suppliers regardless of the occurrence 
of labor protests. Moreover, when a supplier is targeted for a labor protest, the likelihood of 
supplier disengagement decreases by 22 percentage points, contrary to Hypothesis 4. This result 
suggests that the efforts to reduce social risk along one’s supply chain are more likely to be 
manifested as engaging with protested suppliers (e.g., conducting supplier audits) rather than 
removing them from its supply chain.  
Finally, the result in Model 5 (Table 4) shows that buyers are more likely to disengage 
from a protested supplier when the supplier operates in a regulatory environment in which 
workers’ rights to protest are not protected. Specifically, when supplier-side workers have a low 
level of freedom of association (i.e., workers’ rights have a value of 0) at their workplaces and 
the right to bargain collectively with their employers, the probability of supplier disengagement 
decreases by 15 percentage points compared to when they have an average or a high level of 
rights (i.e., workers’ rights have a value of 1 or 2). On the other hand, there is no significant 
difference in the probability of supplier disengagement between protested suppliers that operate 
in a region with an average level of workers’ rights and those operate in a region where workers’ 
rights are fully protected. Taken together, these results suggest that buyers particularly react to 
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labor protests taking place in regions where such an event is least likely to occur, supporting 
Hypothesis 5. 
Supplementary Analyses: Labor Protest vs. Natural Disaster 
The results shown in Tables 2 and 3 underscore the circumstances under which supplier-
targeting labor protests impact supply chain dynamics. Two factors that may result in a biased or 
inconsistent estimate are (1) the sample selection bias of protest events and (2) the endogenous 
nature of labor protests. Only a proportion of all public demonstrations receive any media 
attention. Some protests are deemed to be more “newsworthy.” Moreover, the occurrence of 
labor protests is partially driven by the extent of grievances and available resources to the 
workers as well as other environmental conditions that allow protests to occur. Labor protests, as 
a result, arise from the endogenous characteristics of a supplier. In additional analyses (results 
available upon request), I find that labor protests are more likely to occur when a supplier is 
frequently mentioned in the social media and (2) its buyer has a larger market share in the mobile 
handset industry.1 It is plausible that the likelihood of media coverage on protest events is biased 
towards highly visible suppliers. Workers consider the potential benefit of labor protest to be 
greater when the market favors the product that contains their employer’s components, and thus 
they are more likely to demand a larger share of the profit. The latter scenario especially raises 
the possibility of reverse causality, wherein a supplier-targeting labor protest is caused by the 
supplier’s relationship with its buyer. 
One econometrically plausible option to deal with the selection bias of protest events is to 
employ a Heckman two-step model, thus extracting the effects of selection before estimating the 
theoretically relevant coefficients in the second stage. However, prior research suggests that the 
                                                        
1 I obtained proprietary data on mobile handset market shares from IHS for the 2011−2014 period. 
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uncorrected coefficient is in fact more conservative than the corrected coefficient, indicating the 
sample selection bias of protest events will result in false negatives as opposed to false positives 
(Hug & Wisler, 1998). In addition, the fixed-effects approach controls for all, both observed and 
unobserved, time-invariant differences between buyer−supplier dyads. Therefore, the possibility 
that one supplier might be more likely to experience labor protests than other suppliers does not 
affect my main analysis. 
Alternatively, I conducted supplementary analyses by replacing labor protests, which are 
endogenous to the suppliers’ characteristics, with natural disasters, which represent destructive 
exogenous shocks. It is unreasonable to expect natural disasters to be caused by certain 
buyer−supplier relationships. Labor protests may exert a significant effect on buyer−supplier 
dyads before as well as after the events take place. On the other hand, natural disasters should 
only influence buyer−supplier relationships after the event (Tilcsik & Marquis, 2013). 
Furthermore, only including natural disasters with some level of damage (i.e., at least 100 
fatalities and USD 1 million of economic damage) also reduces the likelihood of a disaster event 
going unnoticed by the media (Gaddy & Tanjong, 1986).  
The intuition behind comparing labor protests with natural disasters is that if supplier 
disengagement was primarily driven by cost, then we should expect to see a similar pattern when 
the moderator is something that directly impacts day-to-day operations and firm profitability 
(e.g., technological standardization). On the other hand, factors pertaining to the attention given 
to a buyer−supplier dyad or a supplier (e.g., link visibility and audience geographic diversity) 
should be irrelevant to or deter supplier disengagement. For example, natural disasters are 
unplanned (and unwanted) events that have no significant relationship with supplier-side workers’ 
rights protection. If a supplier’s factory was severely damaged by a natural disaster, a buyer is 
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forced to find a new supplier. This decision should be independent of the extent to which the 
buyer-supplier relationship is visible in the social media.  
Accordingly, I re-ran the analyses for Hypotheses 1−5, using the same set of fixed effects 
and controls used in Tables 2-4, but replacing labor protests with natural disasters.  As reported 
in Table 5, the analysis revealed similar patterns between labor protests and natural disasters 
when the moderator is a supplier achieving technological standardization (Hypothesis 3) or a 
supplier’s implementation of social SCM programs (Hypothesis 4). On the other hand, I found 
no significant interaction between natural disasters and link visibility (Hypothesis 1) as well as 
between natural disasters and workers’ rights (Hypothesis 5). The interaction term between 
natural disasters and audience geographic diversity was opposite of the interaction between labor 
protests and audience geographic diversity (Hypothesis 2) but this term was only marginally 
significant. Taken together, these findings suggest that supplier disengagement in the aftermath 
of social movements is at least partially caused by the perceived relationship between a buyer 




Table 5. Conditional Fixed-Effects Logit Regression on Supplier Disengagement 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
            
Percentage of production cost 0.021 0.021 0.023 0.024 0.023 
 
(0.042) (0.042) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) 
Number of alternative suppliers -0.240 -0.240 -0.086 -0.086 -0.084 
 
(0.240) (0.240) (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) 
Co-mention in newspapers 0.157 0.157 -0.135 -0.133 -0.135 
 
(0.216) (0.216) (0.139) (0.139) (0.139) 
Smartphone -0.743** -0.743** -0.873** -0.873** -0.874** 
 
(0.279) (0.279) (0.160) (0.160) (0.160) 
Supplier node visibility a -0.223+ -0.223+ 
   
 
(0.126) (0.126) 
   
      Buyer-supplier fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included 
      Link visibility a 0.065 0.065 
   
 
(0.096) (0.096) 
   Audience geographic diversity a -0.177* -0.177* 
   
 
(0.081) (0.081) 
   Technological standardization 
  
-0.051 -0.050 -0.051 
   
(0.294) (0.293) (0.294) 
Social SCM program 
  
-1.563** -1.552** -1.559** 
   
(0.207) (0.207) (0.206) 
Workers' rights 
  
0.188 0.187 0.187 
   
(0.198) (0.198) (0.198) 
Natural disaster -14.376** -16.064** -7.444** -0.558 -1.540 
 
(0.952) (1.202) (1.053) (0.748) (2.052) 
Natural disaster x Link visibility 0.289 
    
 
(0.186) 
    Natural disaster x  
          Audience geographic diversity 
 
0.628+ 
   
  
(0.346) 
   Natural disaster x  




   
(1.252) 
  Natural disaster x  
          Social SCM program 
   
-12.133** 
 
    
(0.897) 
 Natural disaster x Workers' rights 
    
0.601 
     
(1.737) 
      Observations 985 985 2,898 2,898 2,898 
Wald chi2 570.3 703.1 243.3 640.4 149.6 
Notes: 
a Data only available for the post-2008 period. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by buyer-supplier dyads.  
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed) 
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Supplementary Analyses: Other Forms of Firms’ Responses to Supply Chain Labor 
Conflicts 
One notable limitation of the current study is the nature of my dependent variable, which only 
captures whether or not a tie exists or not at a given time. My dependent variable does not 
differentiate how, if at all, a buyer is managing its supplier when the latter continues to be a 
component supplier. Studying supplier disengagement has several advantages. First, tie 
dissolution is costly and consequential to organizations involved in the process (Zhelyazkov & 
Gulati, 2016). Second, tie dissolution, supplier disengagement in particular, is well aligned with 
broader theoretical questions about organizational boundaries, make-or-buy decisions, supplier 
switching costs, and supply chain management (Monteverde & Teece, 1982). Third, tie 
dissolution can be observed and measured in a systematic fashion across many organizations and 
across a long period of time, which is a substantial challenge in my empirical context. 
However, supplier disengagement is only one of various ways firms may respond to 
supply chain labor conflicts. For example, research on organizational stigma suggests a long list 
of possible organizational reactions including concealing, defining, denying, accepting 
responsibility, and withdrawing (Sutton & Callahan, 1987). Also, one can borrow from research 
on employee job dissatisfaction where actors have an option among voice, exit, loyalty, and 
neglect (Hirschman, 1970; Withey & Cooper, 1989).  
While exploring all of these options are beyond the scope of this chapter, there are new 
data sources and methods that can be used for future research. For example, third-party supplier 
audit reports, often conducted at the factory level, provides an opportunity to measure if buyers 
are actually engaging with their suppliers. Furthermore, they allow researchers to understand 
how successfully such initiatives are being implemented on the ground in great detail 
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(Distelhorst, Hainmueller, & Locke, 2017; Locke, Qin, & Brause, 2007; Short et al., 2016). 
Another possibility is to use press releases to see if companies are responding to their suppliers’ 
issue and whether their responses pertain to concrete, technical actions as opposed to ceremonial 
actions (Zavyalova, Pfarrer, Reger, & Shapiro, 2012).  
As an exploratory analysis, I downloaded all press releases from PR Newswire and 
Business Wire that mention at least one of the 47 mobile handset manufacturers (buyers) from 
2001 to 2014. This query yielded 199,327 press releases and about 16% (n=32,566) of them were 
released by the buyers in my sample. About a fifth (n=6,626; 20.35%) of press releases published 
by the buyers in my sample pertain supplier or supply chain issues. I used a type of unsupervised 
topic modeling called Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA), which is used to identify hidden 
thematic structure in large collections of documents. For a corpus of documents, LDA produces a 
set of “topics,” groups of words that are associated with a single theme. In LDA, the number of 
topics is specified in advance by the researcher, and the output presents a list of topics wherein 
each topic is formally defined as a distribution over a vocabulary. Then it analyzes the corpus to 
estimate simultaneously the topics and how the documents exhibit them (Blei, 2012; Blei, Ng, & 
Jordan, 2003). The corpus I used for LDA consists of 6,626 press releases initiated by a buyer 
that mentions the word(s) “supplier” or “supply chain”. I removed common English stop words 
(e.g., the, this, is, are) and short vocabularies (i.e., 4 or fewer characters), and singularized all 
vocabularies in plural form (e.g., the word “businesses” becomes “business”). Since there is no 
statistical test for the optimal number of topics or for the quality of a solution (DiMaggio, Nag, 
& Blei, 2013), I re-ran the algorithm with 10, 30, 50, and 100 topics, but found little systematic 
differences from increasing the number of topics.  
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Table 8 in the Appendix displays the 30-topic solution. Topic order has no meaning. 
Within each topic, the 20 words with highest probability are presented. LDA results indicate that 
the majority of these releases pertain to new product announcement or earnings. Unfortunately, 
companies’ press releases rarely cover social movements targeting their suppliers. As shown in 
Table 6, even when companies initiate a press release to comment on their relationships with 
suppliers, the majority of them concern promoting supplier engagement such as increasing 
interactions with their supplier base. Companies hardly discuss supplier disengagement or 
termination in their press releases. Supplier-targeting protests are almost never the reason behind 
a company issuing a press release. 
 
Table 6. Frequency of Press Releases Covering Supplier Engagement and Disengagement 
Type Frequency Percentage 
All press releases mentioning a buyer 
 
199,327 100% 
All press releases mentioning a buyer, 
          and mention supplier or supply chain, 
          and mention protest 
           
 
34 0.02% 
All press releases initiated by a buyer 
 
32,566 100% 
All press releases initiated by a buyer,  
          and mention supplier or supply chain 
 
6,626 20.35% 
All press releases initiated by a buyer,  
          and mention supplier or supply chain, 
          and mention supplier engagement 
 
258 0.79% 
All press releases initiated by a buyer,  
          and mention supplier or supply chain, 
          and mention supplier disengagement 
47 0.14% 
 
All press releases initiated by a buyer,  
          and mention supplier or supply chain, 





Source: PR Newswire (n=95,257) and Business Wire (n=104,070) 
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DISCUSSION 
Modern firms are increasingly expected to be accountable for the sustainability practices of their 
suppliers. Therefore, when suppliers become targets of labor protests, buyers also bear some 
responsibility and are expected to respond. In recent years, the public scrutiny on buyer-supplier 
relationships has grown due to the advent of social media. This heightened scrutiny forces buyers 
to be even more accountable for the sustainability of their suppliers. In my study of mobile 
handset manufacturers and their first-tier suppliers from 2002 to 2014, I found that supplier-
targeting labor protests lead buyers to disengage from protested suppliers when those buyer-
supplier relationships are highly visible on social media. The volume and audiences’ geographic 
concentration of supplier-mentioning social media posts substantially reduces the likelihood of 
supplier disengagement, possibly suggesting that the geographic diversity of social media posts 
contributes to disagreement and polarization which weakens the power of social media to act as a 
unified collective, sending a mixed signal to buyers on whether or not to disengage from 
protested suppliers (Dutta, 2016).  
Somewhat surprisingly, companies that participate in social supply chain management 
programs are found to be reluctant to switch away from protested suppliers. Instead, the 
participation in these programs seem to encourage companies to engage with protested suppliers 
and help suppliers to build their capacity to deal with sustainability issues. One implication of the 
findings related to companies’ involvement in social supply chain management programs is that 
firms’ endeavors to achieve supply chain sustainability may unintentionally and 
disproportionally raise standards for entrants but not for incumbents, allowing troubled suppliers 
to remain central players in the industry. As the notion of supply chain sustainability becomes 
more popular in the field, most firms, both those with high and low involvement in CSR 
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programs, will expend great effort when screening and selecting new suppliers. However, the 
pruning out of protested suppliers is primarily driven by companies with low involvement in 
CSR program. As a result, the global network may become very strict for entrants but seemingly 
forgiving to incumbents. 
Finally, the extent to which workers’ rights are protected also influences buyer-supplier 
network dynamics. The results show that buyers are more likely to cease their relationships with 
protested suppliers when the suppliers operate in a poor regulatory environment where workers 
have a low level of freedom of association at their workplaces and restrictions to their right to 
bargain collectively with their employers. This suggests that buyers are more likely to disengage 
from protested suppliers in places where protests are not allowed; protests occurring in such 
environments are likely perceived as more disruptive and costly. 
This study makes several theoretical contributions. First, this work contributes to the 
literature on how illegitimate or controversial activities are spread through inter-organizational 
relationships (Briscoe, Gupta, & Anner, 2015; Davis, 1991). I explore how firms proactively 
prune their networks to remove nodes that were targeted for labor protests, which may halt the 
diffusion of questionable practices in their production network. Existing work also suggests 
status and legitimacy concerns play an important role in affecting the dissolution and 
replacement of ties with controversial partners (Jensen, 2006; Jensen & Roy, 2008; Sullivan et 
al., 2007). My study builds on this work by highlighting the important distinction between actual 
and perceived relationships with controversial partners. I propose this distinction meaningfully 
impacts whether firms disengage from controversial partners. Although there is some work 
comparing the different effects of actual and perceived relationships on individuals’ network 
dynamics (Kilduff & Krackhardt, 1994), I build on this individual-level work by exploring this 
 72 
distinction at the firm-level, among buyers and suppliers. Lastly, my work builds on prior work 
about how perceived relationships may exist in the absence of actual relationships (Greve et al., 
2016; Huang & Li, 2009; Jonsson et al., 2009). Co-mentions of firms in social media posts proxy 
the cognitive social structure, or the perceived image of a company’s interfirm relationships. 
Contrasting such perceived relationships with actual relationships collected from unique bill-of-
materials, I show that actual relationships can actually be masked by the absence of perceived 
relationships. Specifically, my study investigates how the illegal or illegitimate behaviors of 
network partners may go unchecked because actual relationships between buyers and suppliers 
are not visible or perceived by the public. 
Second, this work contributes to the emerging literature on the influence of social media 
on social movements. On the one end, there are people calling for Twitter to be nominated for 
the Nobel Peace Prize due to its role in bringing about the Arab Spring. On the other end, 
represented by Malcolm Gladwell’s (2010) attention-grabbing title “Why the revolution will not 
be tweeted,” there are people who downplay the efficacy of social media at achieving the goal of 
the protesters. My work suggests that buzzes, retweets, and likes fueled by social media can yield 
desirable social movement outcomes. Even though most social media users are free-floating 
agents who engage in low-commitment behaviors (Mercea, 2012), have little or no personal 
relationship with the actual protesters (cf. McAdam & Paulsen, 1993), and do not live in the 
same region or country as the actual protesters (Morozov, 2012), their online activity helps to 
shine a spotlight on buyers’ relationships with protested suppliers. Without scrutiny from social 
media, buyers will be less compelled to respond to supplier-targeting labor protests by 
disengaging from protested suppliers. 
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Finally, my work contributes to research on sustainable supply chain management. This 
study examines how companies manage their supply chains to deal with social risks such as 
labor protests, complementing the abundant research on how companies manage their supply 
chains to deal with environmental risks (Beamon, 1999; Sarkis, 2003; Srivastava, 2007). This 
study documents how social supply chain management programs influence companies’ decisions 
relating to their supplier selection and retention. Richard Locke’s (Locke, 2013; Locke et al., 
2007) research on Nike’s supply chains reveal two things. First, private auditing and monitoring 
systems incur substantial costs, but are unable to deliver a stable, significant improvement in the 
working conditions in the supply chains such as the protection of freedom of association or the 
reduction of excessive working hours. Second, real improvement in labor conditions can be 
achieved by a capacity building approach wherein suppliers are not seen as immoral agents but 
rather as willing partners who lack certain organizational skills for effective code of conduct 
enforcement.  
My results suggest that buyers that are involved in social supply chain management 
programs are more likely to maintain relationships with protested suppliers, rather than ending 
those relationships. Indeed, when buyers keep their relationships with protested suppliers, they 
can positively influence suppliers through two approaches – compliance with requirements and 
capacity building (Ciliberti, Pontrandolfo, & Scozzi, 2008). The first approach involves buyers 
setting standards for suppliers and incentivizing compliance via a strict monitoring program. The 
second approach involves building up the supplier’s own capacity of addressing sustainability 
issues. Consistent with Locke’s argument, my research shows that a firm’s focus on long-term 
relationships with suppliers indeed results in continuing engagement with its suppliers even 
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when they are targeted for social movements, reducing the tendency to cut-and-run at the 





Table 7. List of Newspapers Included in the Analysis to Measure Buyer-Supplier 
Newspaper Co-mentions  
Title Frequency Headquarter Location 
The Mercury News 18,877 USA 
The Globe and Mail 14,382 CAN 
The New York Times 13,618 USA 
Los Angeles Times 9,073 USA 
The Toronto Star 8,476 CAN 
The Daily Telegraph 8,272 GBR 
The Guardian 8,001 GBR 
Chicago Tribune 7,449 USA 
The Australian 7,354 AUS 
The Washington Post 7,018 USA 
The New Zealand Herald 6,103 NZL 
The Straits Times 5,821 SGP 
The Irish Times 5,690 IRL 
The San Francisco Chronicle 5,377 USA 
South China Morning Post 5,363 HKG 
The Dallas Morning News 5,348 USA 
Australian Financial Review 5,312 AUS 
Wall Street Journal Abstracts 5,184 USA 
USA Today 5,000 USA 
The Star-Ledger 4,802 USA 
The Independent 4,745 GBR 
The Houston Chronicle 4,452 USA 
The Boston Globe 4,450 USA 
Information Bank Abstracts 4,384 USA 
The Business Times Singapore 4,241 SGP 
The Seattle Times 4,151 USA 
Herald Sun/Sunday Herald Sun 3,953 AUS 
The Courier Mail/The Sunday Mail 3,923 AUS 
Sydney Morning Herald 3,799 AUS 
Orlando Sentinel 3,634 USA 
The New York Post 3,560 USA 
New Straits Times 3,472 MYS 
The Daily Telegraph 3,447 AUS 
Sun-Sentinel 3,344 USA 
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution 3,329 USA 
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Title Frequency Headquarter Location 
The Advertiser/Sunday Mail 3,201 AUS 
Chicago Sun-Times 3,147 USA 
The Kansas City Star 3,085 USA 
Tampa Bay Times 3,081 USA 
Newsday 3,024 USA 
The Miami Herald 2,879 USA 
The Japan News 2,671 JPN 
Grand Rapids Press 2,440 USA 
The Boston Herald 2,401 USA 
Daily News 2,217 USA 
St. Louis Post-Dispatch 2,171 USA 
The Observer 2,162 AUS 
The Herald 2,087 GBR 
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette 2,042 USA 
St. Paul Pioneer Press 2,011 USA 
The Philadelphia Inquirer 1,951 USA 
The Age 1,904 AUS 
Sacramento Bee 1,835 USA 
The Orange County Register 1,785 USA 
The Columbus Dispatch 1,586 USA 
Detroit Free Press 1,561 USA 
The Press 1,541 NZL 
The Denver Post 1,510 USA 
The Arizona Republic 1,504 USA 
Fort Worth Star-Telegram 1,474 USA 
The San Diego Union Tribune 1,378 USA 
The Buffalo News 1,377 USA 
The Daily Oklahoman 1,351 USA 
The Baltimore Sun 1,303 USA 
The Courier-Journal 1,296 USA 
The Dominion Post 1,292 NZL 
The Charlotte Observer 1,212 USA 
Canberra Times 1,177 AUS 
Hobart Mercury/Sunday Tasmanian 1,165 AUS 
The Tampa Tribune 1,149 USA 
San Antonio Express News 1,107 USA 
The Oregonian 1,064 USA 
The Jerusalem Post 1,001 ISR 
The Detroit News 984 USA 
The Indianapolis Star 968 USA 
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Title Frequency Headquarter Location 
The Plain Dealer 930 USA 
Star Tribune 860 USA 
The Cincinnati Enquirer 853 USA 
The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel 825 USA 
The Christian Science Monitor 823 USA 
The West Australian 756 AUS 
Arkansas Democrat-Gazette 700 USA 
The Hartford Courant 697 USA 
Times – Picayune 632 USA 
Northern Territory News 434 AUS 
The Philadelphia Daily News 388 USA 
Gazeta Mercantil Online 363 BRA 
Sunshine Coast Daily 262 AUS 
Journal of Commerce 243 USA 
The Nelson Mail 181 NZL 
The Hartford Courant 157 USA 
The Independent - Daily Edition 154 GBR 
The Morning Bulletin 133 AUS 
The Northern Star and Rural Weekly 132 AUS 
The Chronicle 109 AUS 
The Queensland Times 107 AUS 
The Daily Mercury and Rural Weekly 101 AUS 
NewsMail and Rural Weekly 98 AUS 
The Observer 89 AUS 
The Coffs Coast Advocate 73 AUS 
Business Times 72 MYS 
Daily Examiner 69 AUS 
The Gympie Times 63 AUS 
Tweed Daily News 48 AUS 
Fraser Coast Chronicle 46 AUS 
Warwick Daily News 31 AUS 
Sunshine Coast Sunday 27 AUS 




Table 8. 30-Topic Solution, Unsupervised Topic Model, 20 Highest-Ranked Terms per Topic 
Topic 1 Topic 2 Topic 3 Topic 4 Topic 5 Topic 6 Topic 7 Topic 8 Topic 9 Topic 10 
Fujitsu Nokia percent Siemens Siemens income Siemens group mobile Panasonic 
product mobile quarter automation plant operating healthcare share Nokia power 
America service company energy system financial solution million service system 
computer phone million industry power non-GAAP medical billion company service 
information company share software technology quarter system financial technology energy 
solution network table company billion company information market software solution 
technology ability market project company billion patient business product technology 
warranty device product technology automotive million technology company solution turbine 
leading music year-over-year power control revenue clinical income information information 
drive product revenue product emission fiscal imaging ended network product 
trademark experience operating service world segment management march platform company 
drives technology Lenovo business sector share customer profit internet America 
service people segment solution solution expense health fiscal application provide 
services including earning information information amazon diagnostic revenue development customer 
communication available shipment management September statement company consolidated leading leading 
performance market billion plant product including support service mobility north 
products internet service manufacturing generation month billion result industry business 
including solution financial division turbines consolidated provide operating world global 
scanner world result customer supplier measure workflow mobile provide industry 





Topic 11 Topic 12 Topic 13 Topic 14 Topic 15 Topic 16 Topic 17 Topic 18 Topic 19 Topic 20 
Lenovo cisco Fujitsu mobile service Lenovo network Kyocera digital security 
Panasonic product network network Alcatel-lucent market service solar cable network 
display software optical company customer product mobile energy video service 
entertainment information networking world company company solution corporation television company 
product trademark communication china solution business Alcatel-lucent power service enterprise 
company customer service service global Siemens technology company broadband T-Mobile 
design industry solution solution business global access global system solution 
technology technology Ethernet communication technology billion operator module Motorola customer 
video service transport technology enterprise technology communication ceramic technology product 
available business platform market system customer provide ceramics information earthquake 
consumer solution flashwave Nokia provider information telecom industrial satellite wireless 
mobile company trademark global world service services generating Siemens technology 
corporation global support leading provide solution customer group solution 
ultra-
broadband 
include network system customer network group provider japan provide information 
processor market Richardson provide industry growth broadband material network stoneware 
electronic Siemens customer information networking industry system metal communication communication 
thinkcentre system product supplier services Panasonic information advanced set-top provide 
offer provide market product cisco system networks equipment company Alcatel-lucent 
world server north system Alcatel world company headquarters access world 





Topic 21 Topic 22 Topic 23 Topic 24 Topic 25 Topic 26 Topic 27 Topic 28 Topic 29 Topic 30 
Toshiba Motorola product Siemens hearing mobile service Siemens tablet statement 
Kyocera product Fujitsu technology Alcatel-lucent service solution imaging ThinkPad company 
wireless technology technology information technology network network medical business 
forward-
looking 
product service software healthcare Siemens solution smart healthcare Lenovo solution 
device system storage industry instruments Nokia system patient cloud product 
power company biometric student company business communication diagnostic solution projector 
company digital solution education network company mobile clinical window including 
mobile solution design Lenovo solution technology company system technology information 
phone electronic America school service customer provide information retail business 
available information system solution waterproof operator information technology product security 
information global information company billion internet product solution customer technology 
electronic communication application world instrument market market image touch service 
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Network Mechanisms of Supply Chain Evolution, 2007-2013 
 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the key business trends over the last couple of decades has been the outsourcing of key 
business activities to suppliers and subcontractors. Supply chains are increasingly becoming 
longer, more dispersed, and more complex. Such trends have two implications. First, supply 
chains became less visible not just to investors and consumers, who are not participating in the 
production process, but also to the companies themselves. Second, companies are also 
increasingly exposed to high impact low probability discrete events along their supply chains 
such as natural disasters, social and political instability, and equipment malfunctions and 
systemic failures (Kleindorfer & Saad, 2005).  
In theory, firms deliberately draw a distinction between what activities should be 
conducted inside the firm boundary versus outside of it (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1981). 
Transactions within the firm’s boundary can be monitored and controlled by management, while 
the firm’s ability to do this with its suppliers is limited by contracts. Firms seek to seal off their 
core technologies from environmental influences (Thompson, 1967) and to manage external 
control (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). At the same time, the fit between a firm and the environment 
is critical for performance and survival (Miles & Snow, 1994). Therefore, the architecture of a 
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firm’s supply chain network -- the nodes, edges, and the resulting structure from these edges -- 
would not only represent and reflect its strategy but also influence its performance (Ahuja et al., 
2012). In a supply chain context, the buyer has some level of agency in terms of orchestrating a 
particular network architecture. It can identify a potential supplier from a pool of qualified 
candidates, and it can choose to create, maintain, or terminate relationships with individual 
suppliers. As an individual firm makes these decision based on its preferences, constraints, and 
objectives, a global network as an organizational field evolves over time while the field’s 
properties also influence individual field participants.  
 In most cases, field reproduction, or the persistence of a given network architecture, is the 
default option, normally preferred by all actors (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). Relationships 
tend to endure. Firms that had ties between them in the past are more likely to form ties again in 
the future (Gulati, 1995; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). A longitudinal analysis on supplier selection 
in the mobile handset industry also documents that there are high perceived switching costs and 
strong inertia in customer–supplier matches (Alcacer & Oxley, 2014). 
One factor that can perturb the stability of the social structure is the occurrence of events 
that are hard to foresee and have disruptive and potentially inimical impact (Meyer, 1982). The 
occurrence of such events may destabilize a system and invite new logics of action and 
interaction, altering the relationships within the field (Corbo, Corrado, & Ferriani, 2016; 
Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Powell et al., 2005). Such “shocks” to a system “…can destabilize it 
and result in a tip in the rules of affiliation and the resulting combinatorial possibilities” (Powell 
et al., 2005:1190). The occurrence of an environmental jolt, i.e., a low probability discrete event 
impacting all market participants, provides an opportunity to investigate the process by which an 
organizational field transforms.  
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 In this chapter, I identify the network mechanisms underlying the network formation 
process in the mobile handset industry, and investigate how the network mechanisms changed 
due to an environmental jolt. Specifically, I use several events that occurred in 2010 as an 
environmental jolt. These events include (1) the Foxconn suicides in Shenzhen, China, (2) the 
proposal of Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
and (3) the passage of the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act. These events greatly 
increased the amount of attention given to supply chain issues, affecting how firms manage their 
relationships with extant suppliers, as well as how firms choose new suppliers as the potential 
cost associated with supplier issues increased. The changes spurred by a sudden increase in the 
visibility of supply chain involve firms (1) spending more time and energy to understand their 
supply base and (2) disclosing more information about their supply chains.  Micro-macro 
linkages between an individual’s behavior in networks and global network properties often yield 
unintended consequences. The overall results of this study suggest that firms’ endeavors to 
achieve supply chain sustainability may disproportionally raise standard for low-degree actors 
but not for high-degree actors, allowing them, both high-degree buyers and high-degree suppliers, 
to remain central players in the industry. 
In the section that follows, I briefly describe these events that occurred in 2010 and how 
firms were affected by the tragedy with a focus on firms’ commitment to corporate sustainability.  
2010 AS AN ENVIRONMENTAL JOLT IN SUPPLY CHAINS 
Hon Hai Precision Industry Company, more commonly known by its trade name Foxconn, was 
founded in 1974 in Taipei, Taiwan. In 2010, Foxconn was the largest contract electronics 
manufacturer in the world. Experts predicted that by 2011, Foxconn would take in more than half 
of the global electronics manufacturing service industry revenue. Foxconn’s tremendous 
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commercial success is juxtaposed against the harsh working conditions of its young factory 
workers (Chan & Pun, 2010). Within a period of fewer than eight months during 2010, 18 
workers attempted suicide at Foxconn facilities in China. The employees ranged in age from 17 
to 25. Fourteen of them were successful in their suicide attempt and the remaining four survived 
with serious injuries (Chan, 2011). An additional 20 suicide attempts were reportedly thwarted 
by company officials in the same period (Student & Scholars Against Corporate Misbehavior, 
2010).  
The shocking suicide events at Foxconn sparked a global media frenzy, focusing the 
world’s attention on the poor labor conditions of Foxconn’s workers and the dark side of the 
manufacturing supply chains of China’s export industry. The international media labelled the 
spate of suicides as the “suicide express” (Jones, 2010). The New York Times took on a leading 
role in the US mainstream media response, with its in-depth coverage of the Foxconn suicides, 
further placing the issue under international scrutiny (Guo, Hsu, Holton, & Jeong, 2012). 
Academics, too, offered harsh critique of the labor problems at Foxconn and other Foxconn-like 
manufacturers, and raised concerns about the social responsibilities of these manufacturers’ 
global business partners, including Apple, Cisco Systems, Dell, Hitachi, HP, IBM, Intel, LG, 
Nokia, Panasonic, Samsung, Sony, and other major electronic firms (Chan & Pun, 2010; Ling, 
Kee, & Kueng, 2011; Yuan et al., 2010). Apple, one of Foxconn’s largest customers, was 
especially implicated in the suicide scandal as the factories where the suicides occurred produce 
high-profile Apple products such as the iPod and iPhone (Lucas, Kang, & Li, 2013).  
 Following the suicide events, Foxconn was initially undaunted by the negative publicity. 
Foxconn vice president Cheng Tianzong responded to journalists by saying, “…[S]ome major 
clients are very concerned with the Foxconn employee suicides, but many of them are our long-
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term partners. So it doesn’t affect Foxconn’s orders” (quoted in Zhao (2010)). Indeed, computer 
companies tend to focus on long-term relationships with their main contractors, although they 
sometimes shift contracts to those who can offer better quality, lower cost or greater capabilities 
(Dedrick & Kraemer, 2011). However, soon after the suicide events in 2010, Apple apparently 
shifted some iPhone and iPad orders to Taiwanese-owned Pegatron to diversify risk and 
minimize disruption (Chan, Pun, & Selden, 2013). This diversification highlights the power 
asymmetries between Apple and its manufacturers as they seek to retain their market position as 
manufacturers of Apple products. At the same time, global electronic companies continue to 
exert immense pressure on suppliers to compete against each other on price, quality, and delivery.  
 The Foxconn suicides of 2010 coincided with the proposal of Section 1502 of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (so-called “conflict minerals act”) in 
December 2010. This rule was introduced because of concerns that the use of conflict minerals 
may help finance armed groups in the Congo area. Under the rule, every SEC filing company—
both domestic and foreign issuers—that deems that such minerals 1) are necessary to the 
functionality or production of a product manufactured or 2) are contracted to be manufactured by 
the company, would be required to conduct a reasonable investigation and determine whether or 
not the company’s products are clear from the use of conflict minerals and potentially 
subsidizing war. In essence, this investigation required companies to visualize their complete 
supply chains (Kim & Davis, 2016). 
 Another closely related event of 2010 is the passage of the California Transparency in 
Supply Chains Act, which requires all retailers and manufacturers with annual global revenues of 
more than $100 million that do business in the state of California to disclose information about 
their efforts to eradicate slavery and human trafficking from their direct supply chains when they 
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make tangible goods for sale. The main goal of the Act was to improve corporate responsibility 
practices, refine traceability technologies and create more informed and discerning consumer 
preferences (Pickles & Zhu, 2013), partially through extending the liability of firms for human 
rights issue even outside their boundaries (Barrientos, 2013). 
 These events of 2010 greatly affected how firms manage their relationships with 
suppliers. These changes were not limited to electronics companies that had deals with Foxconn, 
operating in the mining industry, or did business in California. In short, these changes involve 
firms spending more time and energy understanding their supply base and disclosing more 
information about their supply chains due to the potential cost associated with supplier issues 
increased. To describe how these events altered the nature of buyer-supplier relationships at the 
field level, I downloaded the sustainability metrics of all companies that have a global company 
key (GVKEY) from Bloomberg ESG platform, which resulted in 13,872 unique firms.  
 In Figure 15, I show the distribution of the supplier audits publicly reported by the 
sampled companies for a three-year period before and after 2010, respectively. Less than 0.5% of 
these 13,872 companies reported records of supplier audits in any year between 2007 and 2013. 
Nonetheless the pattern suggests that companies are increasingly checking the labor conditions 
of their suppliers. 
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Figure 15. Number of Supplier Audits Conducted, 2007-2013 
 
Notes:  
I removed 8 outliers reported by four companies. These companies include Brasil Foods S.A., Monsanto, Syngenta, 
and Wal-Mart, all of which reported at least 8,322 (Wal-Mart in 2011) and as many as 37,494 (Monsanto in 2012) 
supplier audits. The average number of supplier audits conducted drops from 1206 to 416 once I removed these 
outliers.  
Sources: Bloomberg Environment, Social and Governance (ESG) database, extracted on April 29, 2015.   
 
It is plausible to argue that companies are increasingly paying attention to sustainability issues, 
both social and environmental. However, the comparison between the environmental and social 
aspects of CSR suggests that it was the latter that was affected by the events of 2010. Bloomberg 
reports Environmental Disclosure Score (i.e., degree of transparency on environmental metrics) 
alongside Social Disclosure Score (i.e., degree of transparency on social metrics). Social 
Disclosure Score primarily pertains to supply chain issues, and its three components are the 
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supply chain, where social risks include poor working conditions, the use of child or forced labor, 
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encompass all Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) areas, are publicly disclosed; and (3) 
the total number of supplier audits conducted, wherein audits are concerned specifically with the 
management of environmental and social risks. About one in five sampled companies (2,709 out 
of 13,556) had a valid disclosure score.  
Figure 16 shows the median-spline plots of environmental disclosure and social 
disclosure. The increased focus on buyer-supplier relationships after 2010 is particularly 
remarkable considering that companies’ focus on environmental issues did not meaningfully 
increase during this period. During the three-year period leading up to 2010, the median value of 
both disclosure metrics were rather stagnant at 10 points for social disclosure and 20 points for 
environmental disclosure, respectively. Both disclosure scores remained stable despite the Great 
Recession during this period, and this finding is also consistent with Nollet, Filis, and 
Mitrokostas (2016) that traced S&P500 firms’ corporate social performance during the 2007-
2011 period. 
However, in the three-year period following 2010, the median social disclosure score 
doubled, while companies’ focus on environmental issue was largely unaffected. Taken together, 
these patterns suggest that the aforementioned events that occurred in 2010 may function as a jolt 
in supply chains, which destabilized a system and invited new logics of action and interaction, 
altering the relationships among the field participants. 
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Figure 16. Comparison between Environmental and Social Disclosure, 2007-2013 
 
Sources: Bloomberg Environment, Social and Governance (ESG) database, extracted on April 29, 2015.   
 
NETWORK MECHANISMS AND REACTION TO AN ENVIRONMENTAL JOLT 
Density and Transitivity 
The effect of an environmental jolt on network evolution is contingent upon the nature of the jolt 
(Madhavan, Koka, & Prescott, 1998). For example, an empirical study of North American firms 
found that the advent of new technologies such as remarkable increases in internet usage and 
semiconductor productivity provided significant innovation opportunities which provoke a surge 
of new ties between firms that were previously not connected to each other (Schilling, 2015). 
After experiencing such environmental jolts, firms may pursue more open networks as opposed 
to closed networks in order to access new and diverse resources necessary for continuous 
innovation (Tatarynowicz, Sytch, & Gulati, 2016).  
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The central assumption for using 2010 as an environmental jolt is that several events that 
took place in 2010 resulted in an unexpected, sharp increase in the amount of industry-wide 
attention given to supply chain issues, increasing the potential cost associated with supply chain 
issues, which in turn influenced how firms manage their relationships with suppliers. As stated 
earlier, these changes caused by a sudden increase in the visibility of supply chain involve firms 
spending more time and energy understanding their supply base and disclosing more information 
about their supply chains. Events of 2010 substantially increased public awareness about labor 
issues in global supply chains, as well as the public demand for firms to be more accountable for 
events occurring along their supply chains. In other words, vetting suppliers became more 
important, and associating with an unverified supplier put buyers more at the risk of being seen 
as irresponsible organizations. 
I argue that a sudden increase in the level of visibility given to supply chains will make 
firms reduce their supplier base as opposed to creating ties with suppliers they have not worked 
with in the past. A threat that has impending negative or harmful consequences for organizations 
tend to reduce their flexibility and make them more rigid (Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981). 
Similar to a regime change, environmental jolts that are perceived as a threat and uncertainty 
may motivate a preference for a durable and cohesive network structure (Stark & Vedres, 2006). 
Such a constriction of control leads to simplification and reduction in alternatives considered.  
Creating new ties comes at a price. Firms have a limited capacity to inspect potential 
suppliers and build relationships with them. When a high level of attention is suddenly given to 
how firms manage their suppliers, the cost induced by the establishment of a tie increases further 
compared to the past. Exploiting existing partners help firms reduce the field-wide uncertainty, 
lowering the baseline probability of being penalized by labor issues in their supply chains 
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(Beckman, Haunschild, & Phillips, 2004). As a result, in the aftermath of an environmental jolt 
which increases the visibility of the field, firms may turtle up their supply chain network, 
intensifying pre-existing relationships with trustworthy suppliers. Taken together, I predict the 
following: 
Hypothesis 1: Out-degree (i.e., the buyers’ tendency to create ties with suppliers) 
negatively influences tie creation in the post-2010 period. 
 
Another way firms can respond to the heightened uncertainty following an environmental jolt is 
to create a cohesive network. Transitive closure, i.e., the tendency for a pair of buyers that share 
a common supplier to share more suppliers, has several advantages. First, it may reduce the 
burden of vetting a supplier. For example, in the context of venture syndicates, a prior co-
investment relationship between two parties enable them to trust and rely on each other’s 
assessment and monitoring capabilities regarding indirectly connected potential targets 
(Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). A buyer can also learn about a potential target through its current 
supplier that is in a structurally equivalent position with the target. This tendency diminishes the 
uncertainty associated with future partnerships. Second, cohesive networks help buyers obtain a 
level of accuracy in the information that is being transferred. When a supplier clandestinely 
seeks to hide, distort, or misrepresent any potentially negative information, closed and cohesive 
networks are more likely to detect such an instance and levy appropriate sanctions (Coleman, 
1988). Finally, transitivity in organizational networks tends to be local, either in terms of 
geographic or technological proximity (Madhavan, Gnyawali, & He, 2004). In a supply chain 
context, such a tendency will result in an increase in the sharing of suppliers between two buyers 
that previously shared suppliers. Following an environmental jolt, the local structure of buyer-
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supplier relationships may produce clusters that increase the level of interdependence and 
collaboration over time. Therefore, I predict the following: 
Hypothesis 2: Transitivity (i.e., the tendency for two buyers that share a supplier to 
create ties to have more common suppliers) positively influences tie creation in the post-
2010 period. 
 
Preferential Attachment and Assortativity 
Achieving sustainable supply chains requires a high level of commitment from not just buyers, 
but also suppliers. Many companies ask suppliers to self-assess their sustainability performance 
as an initial screening step in selecting new suppliers or as part of a risk assessment for 
identifying which suppliers may require closer attention. Among supply chain management 
professionals, the selection of new suppliers with relatively high sustainability capabilities and 
practices is considered a primary lever for achieving supply chain sustainability  (UN Global 
Compact & BSR, 2015:55). From the supplier’s perspective, fulfilling such requirements can 
differentiate them from their competitors, becoming an asset to attract new customers in the 
market (Kiessling, Isaksson, & Yasar, 2016). However, fulfilling these requirements, like most 
CSR activities, brings added costs and often hurts the firm’s financial performance. Most 
benefits of CSR revolve around intangible asset creation such as brand image and reputation 
(Carroll & Shabana, 2010). As a result, it is normally suppliers that are rich in resources that can 
participate in such activities. In turn, when there is a strong need to partner with sustainable 
suppliers, I expect previously established suppliers to become more popular. 
 Even if the true state of labor conditions at a particular supplier is unknown, the number 
of existing buyers working with that supplier signals its quality. Research on status also suggests 
that an association with high-status actors enhances the prestige of a firm, while ties with low-
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status actors diminishes it (Podolny, 1993). High in-degree suppliers are considered more 
valuable, and therefore they are desirable partners under high uncertainty. Such a tendency 
results in a rich-get-richer Matthew effect (Merton, 1968), wherein popular actors become even 
more popular. The increased visibility caused by the events that occurred in 2010 made 
established suppliers a safer and more desirable choice. Therefore, following the environmental 
jolt, I argue that suppliers that were already working with a large number of buyers attract extra 
new buyers. 
Hypothesis 3: In-degree popularity (i.e., the tendency for suppliers with high in-degrees 
to attract extra incoming ties due to their high degrees) positively influences tie creation 
in the post-2010 period. 
 
Not all suppliers have the resources or capabilities to attract new buyers. Similarly, not all buyers 
have the means to create ties with popular suppliers. Some buyers may primarily look for low 
procurement prices when choosing a supplier, while others may take into account other non-
financial considerations. High out-degree organizations, which occupy the central position in the 
entire network, tend to create ties with other highly embedded partners to minimize potential 
hazards associated with building new ties (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999).  On the other hand, 
organizations located at the periphery of the network are constrained in their ability to work their 
way towards the center of the network. What is left for them are other peripheral partners. As a 
result, in social networks, there is a general tendency for an assortative mixing wherein high-
degree actors associate with each other (Newman, 2003a), resulting in a core-periphery structure 
in the network.  
Significant changes in assortativity signals a shift in the resource requirements for 
success in the interorganizational field (Ahuja et al., 2012:437). I argue that the added cost 
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associated with pursing supply chain sustainability may reinforce the core-periphery structure. 
The ability to improve workers’ low wages and poor working conditions are most likely to occur 
for established suppliers and buyers that are willing to pay the price. As predicted in Hypothesis 
3, any buyer would prefer to create a tie with a reputed, established supplier. Both buyers and 
suppliers have limited capacity to build relationships with them, and the upheaval in the field 
made popular suppliers even more popular. Other things being equal, prominent suppliers will 
tend to build relationships with prominent buyers, and vice versa. As a result, less popular buyers 
are typically left with opportunities to build ties only with other less popular suppliers.  
In addition, highly visible buyers and suppliers attract a disproportionate amount of 
attention from consumers and activists, influencing them to engage in the efforts to achieve 
supply chain sustainability. On the other hand, small and peripheral firms either do not have the 
resources to do so, and/or are relatively invisible to others. Taken together, I predict that after 
2010, the level of assortative mixing increased, resulting in a stronger core-periphery structure in 
the network. 
Hypothesis 4: Out-in degree assortativity (i.e., the tendency for high out-degree buyers to 
create ties with high in-degree suppliers) positively influences tie creation in the post-
2010 period. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
Data 
As detailed in Chapter Two, to capture fine-grained buyer-supplier relationships in the global 
mobile handset industry, I extracted each component’s maker (supplier) information from each 
individual model’s bill-of-materials compiled by Information Handling Services (IHS). This 
company buys electronic products and breaks them down to trace their component suppliers. 
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Each phone contains hundreds of components. Once the IHS technicians decompose a phone into 
its components, they extract the lot number assigned to each component and verify the 
component’s supplier name, function, and specification. I obtained all mobile handset teardown 
reports published by IHS until 2014, which yielded 399 models. 
To create longitudinal network data centered around 2010, I restricted my sample to the 
2007−2013 period. Limiting sample to this period also reduces the risk of inadvertently 
attributing observed network changes to the transition from feature phones to smartphones 
(Schilling, 2015). Only buyers and suppliers that were active (i.e., released a phone for buyers; 
manufactured a component for a mobile handset for suppliers) since 2007 were kept in the 
analysis, resulting in a sample that consists of 15 buyers and 189 suppliers. It is possible that 
companies that were only active in the pre-2010 period or in the post-2010 period operate under 
different network mechanisms in terms of their directions or magnitudes. As a result, the findings 
here only apply to companies that experienced and survived the events of 2010. The list of 
mobile phone brands (i.e., buyers) are shown in Table 9. 
 
Table 9. List of Mobile Phone Brands Included in the Analysis 
Alcatel Apple Blackberry HTC Huawei 
Lenovo LG Motorola Nokia Panasonic 
Samsung Sharp Sony Vodafone ZTE 
 
For each year y, I created a 15 x 189 matrix where each row represents a buyer and each column 
represents a supplier. Each cell of the matrix takes the value of 1 if a component manufactured 
by a supplier was included in a buyer’s product released in year y or year y-1, and 0, otherwise. 
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Since a buyer has some level of agency in terms of orchestrating a particular network 
architecture, I assume that a buyer sends out a tie, and a supplier receives a tie.  
An analysis of a two-mode network requires two sets of nodes, and ties are only 
established between nodes belonging to different sets. While these are definitional properties of a 
two-mode network, they create two issues in terms of accurately describing the reality. First, 
some suppliers in the mobile handset industry are buyers themselves (e.g., Samsung, LG). 
However, two-mode networks cannot define ties between buyers or between suppliers. Therefore, 
it fails to capture if and how some suppliers accumulate knowledge and resources to become 
buyers, eventually directly competing with them in the product market (Wan & Wu, 2017). 
Second, loops cannot be defined despite their significance (i.e., in-sourcing) in reality. As a 
result, I removed all loops, and treated an organization that is a buyer as well as a supplier as two 
distinct entities. For example, ties from Apple as a buyer to Samsung as a supplier are included, 
and ties from Samsung as a buyer to Samsung as a supplier are excluded.  
Methods 
Investigating the mechanisms that drive network change over time requires a method that allows 
for the simultaneous analysis of different effects on network change. Therefore, in this chapter I 
use a type of stochastic actor-oriented model called Simulation Investigation for Empirical 
Network Analysis (SIENA). SIENA is designed for statistically estimating models for network 
evolution by combining panel data and an actor-driven approach (for details, see Conaldi, Lomi, 
& Tonellato, 2012; Ripley, Snijders, Boda, Voros, & Preciado, 2017; Snijders, van de Bunt, & 
Steglich, 2010). Specifically, it identifies the model specification that is most likely to generate 
the observed networks at discrete points in time. This process is done in three steps. First, each 
actor’s objective function that reflects the hypothesized underlying network-formation process, 
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such as in-degree popularity and out-in degree assortativity effects, is defined. Objective 
functions are represented as a linear combination of these network effects. Second, network 
simulation is conducted to maximize actors’ objective functions. The initial observation (i.e., 
network of 2007 in this study) is considered the process starting value. Third, after each iteration, 
parameter values are updated to make the average of simulated statistics as close as possible to 
the statistics obtained from the observed network. This iteration continues until a model 
specification minimizes the divergence between the simulated and observed networks. Due to the 
required computing resources in the simulation, this method is applicable to networks with 
approximately 10 to 1,000 nodes, observed in two more waves. The network sample featured in 
this chapter (7 waves of a two-mode network consisting of 15 buyers and 189 suppliers) meet 
this criterion. 
SIENA, as a class of stochastic actor-oriented models, has three key assumptions. First, 
actors are seen as having full knowledge about the network and attributes of others. Second, 
actors are seen as having agency which allows them to change their outgoing ties and attributes. 
Third, ties are assumed to be states (not events) that are relatively stable, and the network change 
is calculated as an outcome of a Markov process. In other words, only the current state of the 
network probabilistically predicts its next state.   
 In SIENA, network change depends on two functions: rate function and objective 
function. The former determines the opportunities of relational change, which is based on a 
Poisson process for each actor. Objective function describes preferences and constraints of actors 
as choices of tie changes which are determined by a linear combination of effects. The 
combination of the rate function and objective function defines a continuous-time Markov chain. 
At any given moment, one probabilistically chosen actor has an opportunity to change an 
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outgoing tie. This change can be either adding a new tie, dropping an existing tie, or simply 
doing nothing. SIENA only handles binary networks, and thus increasing or decreasing edge 
weight is not an admissible option for an actor. The probability of choice among multiple options 
is modeled by a multinomial logistic regression, specified by an objective function. A description 
of possible tie change patterns is shown in Table 10.  
 
Table 10. Possible Tie Change Patterns between Two Nodes Observed in Two Time Points 
At t1 At t2 Meaning 
i      j i → j Create a new tie 
i → j i → j Maintain an existing tie 
i → j i      j Sever an existing tie 
i      j i      j Maintain not having a tie 
Source: Adapted from (Ripley et al., 2017: 14) 
 
Dependent Variable 
Given that each tie can have four patterns between two time points as shown in Table 2, the rate, 
or the log-odds ratio between different admissible changes are defined as dependent variables. 
This study’s dependent variable, tie creation, captures the propensity for a focal buyer to create a 
tie with a supplier. Specifically, the measure is operationalized as the log-odds ratio between the 
summation of (1a) creating a tie which did not exist in the past and (1b) maintaining an existing 
tie and the summation of (2a) severing an existing tie and (2b) maintaining not having a tie. This 
measure is identical to “network evaluation” in the SIENA framework.  
 In subsequent analyses, I also employ an alternative measure of tie creation. The 
alternative measure uses the log-odds ratio between (1) creating a tie which did not exist in the 
past and (2) maintaining not having a tie. SIENA researchers commonly call this “network 
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creation.” Severing an existing tie is seen as the opposite of creating a new tie. The difference 
between two measures of tie creation is the inclusion or exclusion of maintaining an existing tie. 
The first measure (network evaluation) assumes that the propensity to create a new tie is equal to 
the propensity to maintain an existing tie. Given the importance of supplier switching costs in the 
mobile handset industry, it is necessary to test if my results are affected by this assumption. 
Therefore, in additional analyses I created a new dependent variable, tie maintenance, which is 
defined as the log-odds ratio between (1) maintaining an existing tie and (2) severing an existing 
tie. This measure is identical to “network endowment” in SIENA framework. I reported these 
findings in the Appendix Tables 13 and 14. 
Effect Parameters 
Out-degree effect (density effect). This effect measures the number of outgoing ties. It serves as 
a baseline parameter (i.e., control variable) that must be included in all models. The effect can be 
defined as the following:  
𝑂𝑢𝑡 − 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 = ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗;𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑗
 
where xij=1 if a tie from i to j exists;  0 if a tie from i to j does not exist.  
The possible nonlinear effect of out-degree can be tested by modeling out-degree activity 
effect, which reflects tendencies to dispersion in out-degrees of the actors. This effect captures if 
buyers with high out-degrees send out extra outgoing ties because of their high current out-
degrees. A positive value for this parameter suggests that buyers with many suppliers in a given 
year will continue adding new suppliers in the following year. The use of square roots is 
recommended to reduce the collinearity between this effect and the out-degree effect. The 
measure can be formally defined as the following: 
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Transitivity effect. In a two-mode network, ties can be only established between nodes belonging 
to different sets, therefore a triadic closure cannot be defined. Alternatively, transitivity in two-
mode networks is expressed by the number of four-cycles (Robins & Alexander, 2004). This 
reflects the extent to which actors who make one choice in common also make other choices in 







In-degree popularity effect. This effect is measured as the sum of the square roots of the in-
degrees of the suppliers to which a buyer is tied, and reflects tendencies to dispersion in in-
degrees of the suppliers. The substantive meaning of this effect is the extent to which suppliers 
with high in-degrees attract extra incoming ties from buyers because of their high current in-
degrees. Formally, the effect is expressed as the following: 





Out-in degree assortativity effect. This effect reflects tendencies for buyers with high out-
degrees to prefer to be tied to suppliers with high in-degrees. The use of square roots is 
recommended to reduce the collinearity between this effect and the out-degree effect. The 
measure is defined as the following: 










Table 11 shows network summary statistics. The first three rows of the table describe degree-
related measures. Each year’s bipartite network consists of 15 buyers and 189 suppliers. Density 
measures the number of observed edges divided by the number of possible edges (15 x 189 = 
2,835). During the observation period, each buyer had about 40 ties with suppliers, and the 
density of the network was relatively stable, ranging from 0.177 to 0.235. Another indication that 
the network was relatively stable during the 2007-2013 period can be found from the high values 
of Jaccard index, which is defined as: 
 
𝐽𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 =
𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑖𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑖𝑒 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛,   𝑡𝑖𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛,   𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡𝑖𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
  
 
For example, Jaccard index of 2007 measures the similarity between the 2007 network and 2008 
network, and is calculated as the 516 maintained ties divided by the sum of 91 created ties, 83 
terminated ties, and 516 maintained ties (516/(91+83+516)=0.748). Jaccard index is a measure of 
stability, i.e., the similarity between network at time t and time t+1. Jaccard index values greater 
than 0.3 are recommended as the threshold to estimate the longitudinal data as an evolving 
network as opposed to a collection of disjointed networks (Snijders et al., 2010). Using this 
criterion, the high Jaccard index values during the observation period, ranging from .622 to .748, 




Table 11. Network Summary Statistics 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Density 0.211 0.214 0.188 0.199 0.231 0.235 0.177 
Average degree 39.933 40.467 35.533 37.533 43.600 44.333 33.533 
Number of edges 599 607 533 563 654 665 503 
        Jaccard index 0.748 0.629 0.689 0.638 0.711 0.622 
Tie changes 
 
      
          From 0 to 0 2145 2135 2186 2092 2064 2115  
          From 0 to 1 91 93 116 180 117 55  
          From 1 to 0 83 167 86 89 106 217  
          From 1 to 1 516 440 447 474 548 448  
Notes: 
Networks consist of 15 buyers and 189 suppliers. Tie changes measure the composition of the (before vs. after) x 
(tie absence (=0) vs. tie presence (=1)) frequencies. See Table 2 for details. 
 
Table 12 shows the results of SIENA models for tie creation. In Appendix Tables 13 and 14, I 
also present the results of SIENA models using an alternative measure of tie creation (i.e., log-
odds of creating a new tie over maintaining not having a tie) as well as the propensity to maintain 
an existing tie (i.e., log-odds of maintaining an existing tie over severing an existing tie). As 
previously mentioned, my primary dependent variable assumes that the creation and endowment 
effects are equal. Separating the contribution of an effect into two tie creation and tie endowment 
functions reduces the model’s statistical power, and thus most SIENA studies limit their attention 
to “network evaluation effects,” which is how I measured the study’s dependent variable (Ripley 
et al., 2017). 
 The results across the three dependent variables are remarkably similar, with the notable 
difference being the lack of statistical significance for the main effects (but not the interaction 
effects) of in-degree popularity and out-in degree assortativity in the models shown in the 
Appendix. Convergence ratio, shown at the bottom of the table, captures the extent to which the 
simulated values deviate from the observed values. This value needs to be close to 0, and values 
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smaller than 0.1 indicate excellent convergence (Ripley et al., 2017). Models including the high-
order term of buyers’ out-degree have a convergence ratio greater than 0.1, primarily due to their 
correlation with out-degree. Increasing the number of iterations and repeating the simulation 
after carrying previous estimates gradually decrease the convergence ratio. In this study, I 
repeated the simulation three times for all models, where each simulation were set to have up to 
3,000 iterations for parameter estimation. 
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Table 12. SIENA Models for Tie Creation (i.e., Network Evaluation in SIENA) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Rate parameter, 2007 13.078** 13.122** 13.680** 13.261** 13.207** 13.049** 13.103** 13.942** 13.365** 13.293** 
 
(1.064) (1.026) (1.084) (1.106) (1.079) (1.032) (1.032) (1.214) (1.104) (1.105) 
Rate parameter, 2008 20.787** 20.956** 22.811** 21.224** 21.313** 20.819** 21.062** 23.747** 21.523** 21.608** 
 
(1.462) (1.397) (1.63) (1.438) (1.491) (1.425) (1.46) (1.792) (1.531) (1.536) 
Rate parameter, 2009 16.094** 16.536** 17.944** 16.262** 16.739** 16.272** 17.026** 19.114** 16.412** 17.277** 
 
(1.283) (1.323) (1.483) (1.251) (1.295) (1.235) (1.318) (1.606) (1.256) (1.424) 
Rate parameter, 2010 22.505** 22.966** 25.124** 22.709** 23.29** 21.256** 23.143** 27.085** 21.694** 23.697** 
 
(1.522) (1.575) (1.846) (1.605) (1.683) (1.404) (1.661) (2.052) (1.47) (1.729) 
Rate parameter, 2011 17.187** 17.246** 18.359** 17.473** 17.571** 17.214** 17.408** 18.873** 17.613** 17.699** 
 
(1.197) (1.262) (1.411) (1.295) (1.254) (1.255) (1.275) (1.487) (1.291) (1.242) 
Rate parameter, 2012 21.591** 21.779** 23.704** 22.171** 22.082** 21.643** 21.916** 24.654** 22.369** 22.432** 
 
(1.448) (1.441) (1.653) (1.507) (1.437) (1.477) (1.522) (1.762) (1.522) (1.519) 
Out-degree -0.804** -1.051** -1.147** -1.162** -1.078** -0.812** -1.252** -1.371** -1.366** -1.252** 
 




    
0.052** 
   
  
(0.012) 
    
(0.012) 
   Transitivity 
  
0.006** 
    
0.008** 
  
   
(0.000) 
    
(0.000) 
  In-degree popularity 
   
0.203** 
    
0.303** 
 
    
(0.036) 
    
(0.036) 
 Out-in degree assortativity 
    
0.016** 
    
0.025** 
     
(0.005) 
    
(0.005) 
Post-2010 dummy  
          x  Out-degree      
0.466** 
    
     
(0.077) 
    Post-2010 dummy  
          x Out-degree activity       
0.024** 
   
      
(0.006) 
   Post-2010 dummy  
          x  Transitivity        
0.002** 
  
       
(0.001) 
  Post-2010 dummy  
          x In-degree popularity         
0.201** 
 
        
(0.037) 
 Post-2010 dummy  
          x Out-in degree assortativity          
0.010** 
         
(0.003) 
           Maximum convergence ratio < 0.1 > 0.1 > 0.1 <0.1 > 0.1 < 0.1 > 0.1 > 0.1 < 0.1 > 0.1 
Notes: 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed) 
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The rate function models the speed by which the dependent variable, tie creation, can change. 
Rate parameters estimate the speed by which each network actor gets an opportunity for 
changing its score on the dependent variable, including unobserved changes. As a result, some 
opportunities for change lead to the decision ‘no change’. Some of these changes may be 
cancelled (e.g., making a new choice and then withdrawing it again). As a result, the average 
observed number of differences per actor will typically be smaller than this estimate. On average, 
each buyer had about 17 opportunities for change prior to 2010, and 20 opportunities after 2010.  
Models 1-5 show the results of the weight estimation of tie creation without time 
heterogeneity (i.e., interaction between a structural effect and a time period dummy variable). 
Models 6-10 add an interaction term between a structural effect and a post-2010 period dummy 
variable. Except for rate parameters, other coefficients can be interpreted as rate of change, or to 
be precise, as log-odds ratios: the contributions to log-probabilities of increasing the dependent 
variable by 1 unit when the effect is increased by 1 unit (Ripley et al., 2017). Because these 
estimates are non-standardized, researchers are normally interested in the sign and statistical 
significance of parameters. In short, if a parameter is positive and significant, it can be argued 
that the variable associated with such a parameter drives tie creation. Likewise, if a parameter is 
negative and significant, the variable associated with such a parameter drives tie creation in the 
opposite direction, i.e., it is driving tie dissolution. If a parameter value and significance are null, 
the corresponding effect does not drive tie creation (Lazega, Mounier, Snijders, & Tubaro, 2012).  
While I do not have data to proxy each firm’s size or production capacity, if large buyers 
have more suppliers and vice versa, we would most likely have observed positive coefficients for 
out-degree parameters. However, across all models, out-degree (i.e., density) parameters have 
negative and statistically significant coefficients, suggesting that buyers are reluctant to create 
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and maintain ties with random suppliers. This finding is common in networks where there is a 
cost associated with creating and maintaining random ties. A tie is created and maintained only 
when its cost is outweighed by other components of the utility function which have positive and 
statistically significant parameter estimates. Out-degree activity has a positive effect, indicating 
that high out-degree buyers create and maintain a disproportionately large number of ties with 
suppliers (Model 2). Transitivity (Model 3), popularity (Model 4), and assortativity (Model 5) 
effects are all found to be meaningful predictors for understanding supply chain network 
dynamics. 
In Hypothesis 1, I predicted that buyers will constrict their supplier base to a smaller set 
of suppliers post-2010. Results of Model 6 indicate the opposite. Despite the cost associated with 
creating and maintaining ties (as indicated in the negative main effect of out-degree), I find that 
buyers were expanding their supplier base in the post-2010 period. This was especially so for 
buyers with many existing suppliers rather than few existing suppliers, as indicated by the 
positive interaction between out-degree activity and the time dummy in Model 7. The upper 
panel of Figure 17 shows how the out-degree distribution of buyers changed before (left) and 
after (right) 2010. The comparison between the two graphs clearly indicates a sharp increase in 
buyers’ out-degree.  
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Figure 17. Degree Distribution of 2007-2009 and 2011-2013 
  





Both out-degree (density) effect and out-degree activity effect pertain to creating and 
maintaining random ties, i.e., relationships with suppliers regardless of their extant in-degree. 
Therefore, a positive effect of out-degree and out-degree activity effects raises the possibility that 
the events that occurred in 2010 served as a structure-loosening event wherein previously low in-
degree suppliers became more attractive as a partner than compared to the past (Madhavan et al., 
1998). If buyers are indeed creating and maintaining more random ties after the jolt, buyers’ 
tendency to partner with a high in-degree supplier will be as great as their tendency to partner 
with a low in-degree supplier, eventually reducing the centralization and core–periphery 
separation of the global network. 
However, results from the subsequent models indicate the opposite. Results in Model 8 
suggest a small yet significant increase in the importance of transitivity in the post-2010 period. 
Supporting Hypothesis 2, I find that after 2010, there was a stronger tendency for two buyers that 
already share a supplier to have more common suppliers in the following year. Similar to 
transitive triangles, the parameter for 4-cycles (a bipartite network version of transitivity and 
triadic closure) is an indicator of clustering and strength, which also indicates the presence of 
core-periphery structures in the global network (Borgatti & Everett, 1999). Results show that the 
jolt accelerated local clustering, inducing stronger effects of 4-cycles and making the network 
more cohesive. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 3, in Model 9 I find significant empirical support for the 
preferential attachment mechanism (i.e., in-degree popularity) in the post-2010 period. A 
positive value for in-degree popularity indicates a supplier’s cumulative advantage in which 
large in-degrees reinforce themselves over time leading to high levels of dispersion in the in-
degree distribution in the global network (Snijders et al., 2010). The extent to which buyers, net 
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of their own out-degree, tend to choose suppliers that already have many buyers (i.e., high in-
degree) significantly increased in the post-2010 period. The lower panel of Figure 3 shows how 
the in-degree distribution of buyers changed before (left) and after (right) 2010, using a 3-year 
window. The comparison between the two graphs suggests that the degree distribution did not 
change much for low-degree suppliers. The main difference comes from the thickened right tail 
of the distribution: already popular, proven suppliers became even more popular after 2010. 
Finally, Model 10 tests the assortativity mechanism wherein degree-based homophily 
drives network evolution. Supporting Hypothesis 4, the parameter estimates of the interaction 
term suggests that there is a stronger tendency for buyers with many suppliers to create and 
maintain relationships with suppliers that have many buyers. On the same token, in the post-2010 
period, buyers with few suppliers were more likely to be connected to suppliers with few buyers. 
A significant change in the level of assortativity may indicate a shift in the resource requirements 
for success in the industry (Ahuja et al., 2012). I find that the events that occurred in 2010 
increased the importance of the assortativity logic, reinforcing the core-periphery structure. 
Compared to the pre-2010 period, it became even more difficult for buyers with a narrow 
supplier base to build ties with high-degree suppliers. At the same time, low-degree suppliers 
were also stuck with low-degree buyers. 
Taken together, SIENA results suggest that the supply chain network in the mobile 
handset industry became denser post-2010, resulting in more opportunities for suppliers to attract 
new relationships. However, the level of inequality in terms of suppliers’ in-degree also 
increased, indicating that previously popular suppliers captured most of the new opportunities. 
Figure 18 shows snapshots of the network at the beginning (2007) and end (2013) of the 
observation period. In 2007, the network was much more dispersed and modularized. Each buyer 
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appears as a local hub which has its own supplier base, some of which were being shared with 
other buyers. The network figure of 2013 depicts a much more centralized network. Previously 
high-degree suppliers, which were already manufacturing components for multiple buyers, 
attracted more ties from other buyers. As a result, the network features a strong core-periphery 
structure. I should note, however, that these changes occurred gradually as opposed to suddenly 
after 2010. As indicated by the high level of Jaccard index values, which measures stability of a 
system, what the results show is an evolving network as opposed to a collection of disjointed 





Figure 18. Supply Chain Network of 2007 (top) and 2013 (bottom) 
 




































Node sizes are proportional to node degree, and edge widths are proportional to the number components transferred 
from a supplier to a buyer. Isolates are removed. Both graphs use Yifan Hu’s (2005) proportional layout algorithm 





As products are now routinely produced and sold having never been touched by employees of 
the company named on the label (Davis, 2013), disperse supply chains make addressing 
sustainability issues extremely difficult for both businesses and scholars. Supply chains are 
increasingly becoming longer, more dispersed, and more complex. As a result, they are 
becoming less visible. Companies are also increasingly exposed to high impact low probability 
discrete events along their supply chains. While buyer-supplier relationships are supposed to 
endure, events that are hard to foresee and have disruptive and potentially inimical impact may 
the stability of the social structure, and the logics driving field evolution.  
In this chapter, I used several events that occurred in 2010, including (1) the Foxconn 
suicides in Shenzhen, China, (2) the proposal of Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, and (3) the passage of the California Transparency in 
Supply Chains Act, as an environmental jolt that greatly increased the amount of attention given 
to labor issues in supply chains. Specifically, I investigated how an industry-wide, sudden 
increase in the visibility of supply chain issues influences network mechanisms driving supply 
chain network evolution. In my study of mobile handset manufacturers and their first-tier 
suppliers from 2007 to 2013, I found that the supply chain network became denser after the jolt, 
resulting in more opportunities for suppliers to attract new relationships. Also, my results 
indicate that buyers responded to the heightened uncertainty by pursuing a closed, cohesive 
network. However, the level of network inequality also increased—previously popular suppliers 
captured most of the new business opportunities. Relatedly, a degree-based homophily became 
more prevalent after the jolt, wherein high out-degree buyers were creating ties with high in-
degree suppliers. As the value of being an established supplier increased in the post-2010 period, 
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less popular buyers were left with opportunities to build ties only with other less popular 
suppliers. Thus, a previously dispersed and modularized network became more centralized, 
featuring a stronger core-periphery structure compared to before 2010. 
One interesting finding from the study is the out-degree effect, which had a negative 
effect in general but had a positive effect post-2010. Both out-degree and out-degree activity 
effects pertain to creating and maintaining random ties, i.e., relationships with suppliers 
irrespective to their network attributes. Given the cost associated with creating new ties, most 
SIENA studies using inter-organizational networks data find a negative effect of out-degree. An 
increase in tendencies to create random ties often leads to a reduction of the centralization and 
core–periphery separation of the global network. The poor get richer and highly central actors 
forgo a central position while more peripheral actors become more central. Instead of an increase 
in matches between high-degree buyers and low-degree suppliers, one may expect more matches 
between low-degree buyers and high-degree suppliers. However, results from the subsequent 
models showed the opposite. One plausible explanation is that buyers responded to the events 
that occurred in 2010 by having multiple suppliers for a single component. This approach is 
often viewed as a means of mitigating supply risk, including cost and reliability. However, this 
option also comes at a cost. Keeping multiple suppliers for a single component increases the 
level of coordination needed to improve the efficiency of operations and the difficulty of 
obtaining homogenous inputs (Agrawal & Nahmias, 1997; Milgate, 2001). Moreover, keeping 
multiple suppliers, or having a larger number of suppliers, makes a firm’s supply chain even 
more complex than before. And increased density, i.e., adding more ties, may lead to a sudden, 
non-linear change in the property of the aggregate. 
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 Another interesting observation is that I found the exact same patterns (i.e., increase in 
the tendency of out-degree effect, transitivity effect, popularity effect, and assortativity effect in 
the post-2010 period) for models predicting tie creation and tie maintenance separately (see 
Appendix Tables 13 and 14). As previously mentioned, in the SIENA framework, these two are 
assumed to be equal. However, in interorganizational networks, and in the supply chain context, 
there is often a qualitative difference between creating a new tie and maintain an existing tie 
(Dahlander & McFarland, 2013). For example, it is reasonable to argue that maintaining a 
relationship with an extant supplier would cost a buyer less than creating a relationship with a 
new supplier. Naturally, network mechanisms for tie creation and tie maintenance may differ. 
For example, if the purpose of using network characteristics (e.g., degree) was to reduce 
uncertainty about whether the partner is capable or reliable, network characteristics may be more 
relevant for the formation of a tie but not for its maintenance. Once the relationship has been 
formed, partners can assess each other’s capability and reliability through direct interactions, 
which reduce the value of network-based information (Shipilov, Rowley, & Aharonson, 2006). 
My results, however, suggest that network-based information continues to be a relevant criterion 
for maintaining an existing tie as if direct experience cannot improve the accuracy of judgments 
of each other’s capability and reliability.  
With these findings, the present chapter makes several contributions. First, I contribute to 
the work on network dynamics and field evolution (Fligstein, 1991; Fligstein & McAdam, 2011, 
2012; Powell et al., 2005) by explicating a set of network mechanisms which drive network 
dynamics following an environmental jolt. Extant work primarily focuses on whether actors, 
under duress, increase their network size to seek flexibility (e.g., Schilling, 2015), or whether 
they become rigid and decrease the breadth of their network (e.g., Beckman et al., 2004; Romero, 
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Uzzi, & Kleinberg, 2016). My finding constitutes a notable extension to understanding how the 
pursuit of flexibility (e.g., out-degree) and the pursuit of stability (e.g., transitivity) jointly 
influence field evolution in the aftermath of industry-wide disruptive events, and their 
concomitant implications. Second, my work also hints at the unintended consequences of CSR. 
The simulation results concur with previous findings that the ties between extant, central actors 
tend to create a barrier that restricts outsider’s entry (Hochberg, Ljungqvist, & Lu, 2010). As a 
result, incumbents pursuing an accountable supply chain may create a barrier to entry for 
newcomers. For example, there were 34 new suppliers in my sample that entered the mobile 
handset industry during the 2007-2009 period. There were only 9 new suppliers during the 2011-
2013 period. In other words, firms’ attempts to attain supply chain sustainability may 
disproportionally raise standards for low-degree actors but not for high-degree actors, allowing 
both high-degree buyers and high-degree suppliers to remain central players in the industry. 
Finally the primary objective of this chapter is to investigate if and how “different mechanisms 
play greater or lesser roles as networks evolve” (Rivera, Soderstrom, & Uzzi, 2010:108). Hence, 
this study directly responds to the call for more research on network dynamics (Ahuja et al., 
2012; Rivera et al., 2010).  
In terms of methodology, this study adds to the growing interest in dynamic models of 
social network analysis (e.g, Corbo et al., 2016; Ebbers & Wijnberg, 2010). Stochastic actor-
oriented models such as SIENA allow researchers to apply a dynamic or evolutionary approach 
to social network analysis. As an analytical tool, stochastic actor-oriented models are particularly 
useful in analyzing two-mode network data. Conventional ways of analyzing two-mode network 
data included (1) projecting the data into a one-mode network data, which suffers from the loss 
of information occurring from reducing dimensionality; and (2) running direct statistical analysis 
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of two-mode dyads, which cannot explain for local dependencies from which social networks 
develop and change (Conaldi et al., 2012; Robins & Alexander, 2004). If the assumptions of 
stochastic actor-oriented models can hold in researchers’ empirical settings, these models offer a 




Table 13. SIENA Models for Tie Creation (i.e., Network Creation in SIENA)  
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Rate parameters Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
 
        
Out-degree -1.176** -1.532** -1.348** -1.383** -1.269** -1.716** -1.506** -1.564** 
 

















   
0.159** 
 
   
(0.067) 
   
(0.063) 
 Out-in degree assortativity 
   
0.016 
   
0.024** 
    
(0.011) 
   
(0.011) 
Post-2010 dummy  
          x  Out-degree     
0.591**  
    
(0.151)    
Post-2010 dummy  
          x  Transitivity      
0.005**   
     
(0.001)   
Post-2010 dummy  
          x In-degree popularity       
0.458** 
 
      
(0.075) 
 Post-2010 dummy  
          x Out-in degree assortativity        
0.034** 
       
(0.001) 
         Maximum convergence ratio < 0.1 > 0.1 > 0.1 > 0.1 <0.1 > 0.1 >0.1 > 0.1 
Notes: 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed)  
As of SIENA version 4.0, out-degree activity effect in bipartite networks can be only estimated in network evaluation models. 
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Table 14. SIENA Models for Tie Maintenance (i.e., Network Endowment in SIENA) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Rate parameters Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
 
        
Out-degree -1.316** -1.525** -1.417** -1.456** -1.449** -1.661** -1.521** -1.578** 
 

















   
0.007 
 
   
(0.056) 
   
(0.058) 
 Out-in degree assortativity 
   
0.002 
   
0.005 
    
(0.009) 
   
(0.008) 
Post-2010 dummy  
          x  Out-degree     
0.606**  
    
(0.149)    
Post-2010 dummy  
          x  Transitivity      
0.002**   
     
(0.001)   
Post-2010 dummy  
          x In-degree popularity       
0.191** 
 
      
(0.065) 
 Post-2010 dummy  
          x Out-in degree assortativity        
0.022** 
       
(0.006) 
         Maximum convergence ratio < 0.1 > 0.1 > 0.1 > 0.1 < 0.1 > 0.1 > 0.1 > 0.1 
Notes: 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed)  







Conclusion: Summary of Findings and Implications for Future Research 
 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
My dissertation explores the interplay between social supply chain sustainability and supply 
chains dynamics. Building on my earlier work which suggests that widespread outsourcing may 
have reduced the corporate sector's capacity to account for the practices that yield its products 
(Kim & Davis, 2016), my dissertation is focused on the question of how network visibility 
influences organizational accountability and network dynamics. To explore the shifting shape of 
supply chain networks in this industry, I constructed an original dataset of OEM–component 
supplier relationships extracted from over 400 mobile phones’ bill of materials released from 
2002 to 2014.  
In my first empirical essay (Chapter Three), I studied the manner and mechanisms by 
which social movements (e.g., labor protests and strikes) influence buyer-supplier relationships. 
My results show that supplier-targeting labor protests lead buyers to disengage from protested 
suppliers when those buyer-supplier relationships are more visible on social media (i.e., blogs, 
forums, Twitter, and Facebook), while volume and audiences’ geographic concentration of 
supplier-mentioning social media posts substantially reduces the likelihood of supplier 
disengagement. In addition, buyers’ commitment to supply chain sustainability initiatives and 
supplier-side workers’ political opportunity structures influence the likelihood of supplier 
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disengagement following labor protests. To ensure the robustness of my results, I also compared 
the consequences of labor protests, which suppliers are partially responsible for, with the 
consequences of natural disasters, which suppliers have no control over. Furthermore, I 
conducted an exhaustive search of press releases and newspaper articles, and found that firms 
rarely acknowledge supply chain labor issues. Overall, my findings suggest that although the 
identities of companies’ supply chains are mostly hidden, social media and social movements 
can put a spotlight on supply chain issues. 
In my second empirical (Chapter Four), I investigated how an industry-wide, sudden 
increase in the visibility of the supply chains influences the evolution of organizational fields. 
Environmental jolts, or events that are hard to foresee and have disruptive impact, can perturb 
the stability of social structure, destabilize a system, invite new logics of action and interaction, 
and alter the relationships within the field. Empirically, I used several events that took place in 
2010, including (1) the Foxconn suicides in Shenzhen, China, (2) the proposal of Section 1502 of 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, and (3) the passage of the 
California Transparency in Supply Chains Act, as an environmental jolt in supply chains and 
conducted a series of stochastic actor-oriented models to identify how the network mechanisms 
of network evolution changed after a steep increase in the field-level visibility of the supply 
chain network. Unlike my prediction that firms will constrict their supplier base after the jolt, 
simulation results indicate that the supply chain network became denser, resulting in more 
opportunities for suppliers to attract new relationships. However, the level of inequality in terms 
of suppliers’ in-degree also increased: previously popular suppliers captured most of the new 
opportunities, resulting in a rich-get-richer Matthew effect (Merton, 1968). Also, the logic of 
transitivity and assortativity became more prevalent post-2010, reflecting firms’ preference for 
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established suppliers. As a result, a previously dispersed and modularized network became more 
centralized, featuring a strong core-periphery structure. These findings suggest that firms’ 
endeavors to achieve supply chain sustainability in the post-2010 period may have 
disproportionally raised the standard for low-degree suppliers but not for high-degree suppliers, 
allowing already popular and established suppliers to remain central players in the network. 
FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Against this backdrop, I hope to continue developing my research program on the challenges 
associated with corporate accountability in supply chains settings. Here I provide a set of 
promising future research topics that expand my focus towards an ecosystem-based perspective 
of supply chain networks. I look forward to pursuing these topics in the years to come. 
First, extending the scope of research beyond immediate, direct buyer-supplier 
relationships will allow researchers to explore the impact of social movements that penetrate 
beyond the target firm and its direct partners. The majority of prior research regarding supply 
chain disruptions has focused on their effects on firms’ direct connections. However, recent 
findings show that some firm-specific shocks impact the revenue of firms multiple degrees (i.e., 
paths, tiers) away from their origins (Carvalho, Nirei, Saito, & Tahbaz-Salehi, 2016; Wu, 2016). 
At the same time, much of labor issues in supply chains involve subcontractors, although even 
car manufacturers, which rely heavily on their supply chains, have difficulty identifying their 
fourth- or fifth-tier suppliers. One possible avenue for future research will be exploring how far 
the impact of firm-targeting social movements can propagate along the supply chain network, 
and identifying the set of conditions which cause firm managers to respond to issues that were 
legally and/or physically unrelated to the focal firm (e.g., Dessaint & Matray, forthcoming; 
Tilcsik & Marquis, 2013). Relatedly, this line of research can shed light on if and how supplier-
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targeting social movements can create social and community-based value beyond the protest 
target.   
Second, recognizing that firms are embedded in multiple types of relationships, and 
buyer-supplier relationships being one of them, future research can benefit from investigating the 
evolutionary dynamics of multiplex networks. Firms belong to multiple network layers of 
distinct types of relationships such as dependence, collaboration, and conflict. Multiplex 
networks become consequential when different types of roles and relationships overlap and 
interact with each other, creating processes that cannot be explained by a single network alone 
(Gould, 1991; Heaney, 2014; Padgett & Ansell, 1993; Sytch & Tatarynowicz, 2014). Yet these 
different network layers are correlated with one another rather than being combined at random 
(Min, Yi, Lee, & Goh, 2014; Szell, Lambiotte, & Thurner, 2010). In other words, one type of 
relationship most likely influences the dynamics of another type of relationship. Recent 
methodological advances in stochastic actor-oriented models allow researchers to unravel the 
relationship dynamics among different sets of relationships (Snijders, Lomi, & Torló, 2013). 
Will firms that were targeted by social movements build a coalition among themselves and 
cooperate more in the future (Huitsing, Snijders, Van Duijn, & Veenstra, 2014)? Will the 
increase in interdependence between two firms due to sharing a supplier stifle possible litigation 
between them? Or conversely, can litigation between firms explain why some triads consisting of 
strong collaborative relationships remain open due to their supply chain network dynamics 
(Granovetter, 1973)? Answering such questions will provide a better understanding of the 
dynamics of supply chain networks.  
Finally, a particularly promising direction for future research is the implications for 
entrepreneurial opportunities that put improving supply chain visibility at the core of their 
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business model. In recent years, market researchers witnessed a growing demand from 
consumers for companies to address social and environmental issues. For example, a study of 
consumers from nine of the largest countries in the world by gross domestic product (GDP) 
found that 84 percent of consumers globally report that they seek out responsible products 
whenever they can (Sustainable Brands, 2015). Four-in-five are willing to consume or purchase 
fewer products to preserve natural resources or buy a product from an unknown brand if it has 
strong CSR commitments. The rising demand for supply chain accountability and transparency 
has resulted in a groundswell of new social innovations from entrepreneurs. The same 
technology that enables customers to pay for an item by simply swiping the phone over the tag 
can allow them to link to data about the product’s origin, certifications, and trajectory through 
the chain. Up-and-coming social enterprises use new technologies to create applications and 
tools that provide rich data about conditions along the supply chain. For instance, LaborVoices 
(https://www.laborvoices.com/) uses crowd-sourcing technology to instantly poll factory workers 
based all over the world on the safety and working conditions of the factories in which they work, 
and large corporations purchase and use the information to identify low-risk, model factories and 
hedge against problematic factories. The advent of such technology-driven entrepreneurs 
provides rich research opportunities to investigate how new technologies to provide provenance 
data to the marketplace can reduce the social risk in the global supply chain networks; and how 
the symbiotic interdependence between industry incumbents and new entrants determines the 
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